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COMPANY, a California ] 
Partnership, ; 
Defendants. ) 
i Case No. 900110 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code N. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
?$$ygg PREgEflTED QN APPEAL 
1. Whether Judge Hanson abused his discretion in 
refusing to accept opposing memoranda and counteraffidavits four 
and a half weeks after they were due and 18 days following 
plaintiff s submission of its motion for decision. 
2. Whether the counteraffidavit of defendant Douglas 
Kent Allyn was admissible to contest plaintiff' s motion for 
summary judgment. 
3. Whether the Allyns admissions, which were not 
brought to the trial court7 s attention by the Allyns to contest 
Interlake' s Motion for Summary Judgment, constituted admissible 
evidence. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY PfiQVIglQNg OR fiVfrEg 
Interpretation of the following rules may be 
determinative of the issues in this action: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e) 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; 
defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all 
papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached hereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits 
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him. 
Rule 4-501(1)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Admi ni s t rat i on. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The 
responding party shall file and serve upon 
all parties within ten days after service of 
a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the 
motion, all supporting documentation and a 
copy of the proposed order. If the 
responding party fails to file a memorandum 
in opposition to the motion within ten days 
after service of the motion, the moving party 
may notify the clerk to submit the matter to 
-2-
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the court for decision as provided in 
paragraph 1(d) of this rule. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The 
motion shall be served at least 10 days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The 
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may 
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, 
may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 1(a). 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern 
the procedure in the Supreme Court, the 
district courts, the circuit courts, and the 
justice courts of the state of Utah in all 
actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil 
nature, whether cognizable at law or in 
equity, and in all special statutory 
proceedings, except as governed by the other 
rules promulgated by this court or enacted by 
the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 
81. They shall be liberally construed to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action. 
STATEMENT QF THE Cfr$E 
On or about September 2, 1986, Respondent USA Financial 
Corporation, dba Interlake Thrift - Mortgage Division 
(hereinafter "Interlake") filed three foreclosure actions against 
John B. Swank and Douglas Kent Allyn, dba J & D Properties, a 
-3-
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California partnership, and Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John 
Allyn, Sr., dba Allyn and Company, a California partnership, in 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah. Two 
of these actions, Civil Nos. C-86-6724 and C-86-6725, involved 
adjoining parcels of real estate and were consolidated before the 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson. The third action, Civil No. C-86-
6726, concerned a separate parcel of real property and was 
brought before the Honorable John A. Rokich. 
Interlake propounded requests for admissions, 
interrogatories, and requests for production of documents to the 
Allyns on April 12, 1988. The Allyns failed to respond to the 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents for over 
90 days and ultimately responded only after Interlake' s counsel 
threatened to file a Motion to Compel. In their responses to the 
requests for admissions, the Allyns admitted signing a variety of 
documents, including trust deeds, promissory notes and renewal 
agreements, and further admitted that they failed to make 
payments on the promissory notes and that the promissory notes 
were in default. 
The Allyns' counsel, John Burton Anderson, formally 
withdrew from representing the Allyns on June 22, 1989. 
Immediately thereafter, on June 29, 1990, Interlake filed and 
served on the Allyns a notice to appear in person or to appoint 
counsel. The Allyns ignored this notice. 
-4-
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On November 6, 1989, Interlake filed Motions for 
Summary Judgment in both cases contending there were no genuine 
issues of material fact and that Interlake was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. A copy of Interlake's Motions, 
Memoranda, and Affidavits are attached hereto collectively as 
Exhibit "A". 
On the final day for responding to the Motions for 
Summary Judgment in the two cases, John Burton Anderson filed 
another Notice of Appearance. He also filed an ex parte motion 
requesting that the court postpone consideration of Interlake' s 
Motion for an additional 30 days, and that during such time the 
Allyns be permitted to file an appropriate response to the 
motion. A copy of this ex parte motion is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B". 
On or about November 30, 1989, Interlake filed a 
"Request for a Ruling and Objection to Ex Parte Motion" in the 
two cases, copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit "C", 
Interlake thereby objected to Mr. Anderson's renewed appearance 
as counsel and also objected to the ex parte motion to extend the 
time within which the Allyns would be permitted to respond to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The grounds for these objections 
concerned the Allyns' prior opportunities to timely obtain 
counsel and the Allyns' consistent pattern of unjustifiably 
-5-
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attempting to delay the proceedings. These grounds are set forth 
in greater detail in the attached Exhibit " C". 
Judge Rokich granted the Allyns' motion, and they 
submitted an Opposition Motion of Points and Authorities and 
Counteraffidavit from Douglas Kent Allyn in both cases 
notwithstanding the fact that Judge Hanson had not granted relief 
to file said documents. Copies of these documents are attached 
hereto collectively as Exhibit " D". 
On January 5, 1990, Judge Hanson issued his minute 
entry, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit " E". The 
minute entry denied the Allyn' s motion for additional time within 
which to file a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment for 
the reasons set forth in Interlake' s objection. Further, the 
minute entry granted Interlake' s Motion for Summary Judgment and 
default judgment based on the pleadings and other supporting 
documentation submitted in support of the motion. 
On January 11, 1990 Interlake filed its Reply 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment and objecting to the above-referenced Allyn 
Affidavit in the case before Judge Rokich. A true and correct 
copy of this memorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit "F". 
On January 24, 1990, Judge Rokich issued his minute 
entry, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "G". The 
minute entry granted Interlake7 s Motion for Summary Judgment and 
-6-
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Default Judgment based on the pleadings and other supporting 
documentation submitted in support of the motion. 
On February 6, 1990, Judges Hanson and Rokich each 
executed and entered an Order and Decree of Foreclosure, a copy 
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit " H". Among other things, 
this Order and Decree directs the sale of the subject properties 
pursuant to Utah law, and the entry of a deficiency judgment 
against the Allyns and the other defendants in the event the sale 
of the subject properties is inadequate to cover the outstanding 
indebtedness. 
The Allyns subsequently filed their Notice of Appeal 
and Amended Notice of Appeal contesting Judge Hanson' s and Judge 
Rokich' s rulings below. 
gVMMAfiY QF AR(?VMEflT 
The Allyns failed to present specific evidentiary facts 
to be offered against Interlake' s Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Allyns' unverified admissions could not constitute admissible 
evidence and were not even offered by the Allyns in opposition to 
Interlake' s Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Although the Allyns submitted an opposing affidavit, 
Judge Hanson was within his discretion to disallow submission of 
the Affidavit because the Allyns' delay in filing it violated 
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The 
Rules of Judicial Administration take precedence over less 
-7-
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stringent conditions contained in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
In any event, the affidavit was inadmissible because it 
was not entirely based upon the affiant' s personal knowledge, it 
lacked appropriate foundation, and it violated the parole 
evidence rule. Even assuming that the affidavit were admissible, 
it would not eliminate defendants' liability because defendants 
also signed the relevant Notes in a representative capacity for a 
nonexistent corporation. 
ARCTMENT 
I. THE ALLYNS FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION TO 
INTERLAKE' S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS REQUIRED BY 
RULE 56 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides, in part, that when a party moves for summary judgment, 
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleadings, but must by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in the rule, set forth specific facts demonstrating that 
there is an issue for trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1989); 
figfrgaft Ovtflppr ftflyertig;U9i Ing, yT tAinflgren, 692 P. 2d 776, 779 
(Utah 1984); Treloaaen v. Treloaaen, 699 P. 2d 747, 748 (Utah 
1985). This Rule requires specific evidentiary facts to be 
offered in opposition to a motion that demonstrate there is a 
genuine issue for trial. I&. A party who fails to so respond 
-8-
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w i l l have judgment e n t e r e d a g a i n s t him i f a p p r o p r i a t e . Utah R. 
Civ, P. 5 6 ( e ) . 
A. Jyflge Hsmgpn fl;Lfl r>pt abuse hig frtggretign in 
disallowing the submission of the Allvns/ 
Memorandum in Opposition and the Affidavit of 
DQVglflS Kent AUynT 
In the case before Judge Hanson, the Allyns did not 
introduce any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary 
materials in opposition to the motion. Although Appellants did 
file an &x parte motion for leave to later file affidavits, that 
motion was denied by Judge Hanson for the reasons set forth in 
Respondent's objections thereto, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "C. " 
The Allyns now assert that Judge Hanson erred in 
failing to allow the Allyns to submit the affidavit of Douglas 
Kent Allyn. This affidavit was filed with the Allyns' memorandum 
in opposition approximately four and a half weeks after it was 
due and eighteen days following Interlake' s request for ruling. 
The Allyns acknowledge that Rule 4-501(1)(b) of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration clearly states: 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. 
Responding party shall file and serve upon 
all parties within ten days after service of 
a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the 
motion, all supporting documentation and a 
copy of the proposed order. If the 
responding party fails to file a memorandum 
in opposition to the motion within ten days 
after service of the motion, the moving party 
may notify the clerk to submit the matter to 
-9-
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the court for decision as provided in 
paragraph 1(d) of this Rule. [Emphasis 
added. ] 
The word "shall" in the above Rule clearly mandates 
that an opposing memorandum and all supporting documentation must 
be submitted within ten days following the service of a motion. 
The drafters of the Rule elected not to use the word "may". 
Clearly, the drafters did not intend to allow for a substantial 
loophole which would allow for the submission of an opposing 
memorandum and supporting counter affidavits after a motion has 
been submitted for decision. 
The Allyns contend, however, that because Rule 56(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for the filing of 
affidavits prior to the day of hearing, the Rules of Civil 
Procedure take precedence over the Code of Judicial 
Administration. Interlake' s research did not reveal any cases 
that would resolve this issue and Interlake believes this issue 
to be one of first impression. However, the plain language of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly implies that the Code of 
Judicial Administration should take precedence. Rule 1(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(a) Scope of Rules. These rules shall 
govern the procedure in the Supreme Court, 
the district courts, the circuit courts, and 
the justice courts of the State of Utah in 
all actions, suits, and proceedings of a 
civil nature whether cognizable at law or in 
equity, and in all special statutory 
-10-
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proceedings, except as governed bv other 
rules promulgated bv this court or enacted by 
the legislature and except as stated in Rule 
81. They shall be liberally construed to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action. [Emphasis 
added. ] 
This Rule indicates that other court rules are to take 
precedence over the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Code of 
Judicial Administration has been adopted by the Utah Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council and accordingly should have 
priority over less stringent provisions in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. This result comports totally with the stated 
intent of Rule 4-501, "[t]o establish a uniform procedure for 
requesting and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions. " If 
supporting documentation were allowed to be filed up until the 
day of hearing, regardless of when the motion was submitted for 
decision, chaos rather than uniformity would result and Rule 4-
501 largely would be circumvented. 
Similarly, the stated applicability of Rule 4-501 
further indicates its priority over the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Rule states in relevant part: "This Rule shall apply to 
motion practice in all district and circuit courts except 
proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims 
department of the circuit court. . . " Ifi. Note that the 
application of the Rule is mandatory and contains no provisions 
showing deference to the Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, 
-11-
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Rule 4-501 controls over any conflicting provisions found in Rule 
56(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Judge Hanson correctly 
refused to accept the affidavit of Douglas Allyn after Interlake 
submitted its motion for decision. 
Federal case law has long established that where there 
is a legitimate basis for a procedural rule, a judge' s 
requirement that the rule be followed to the letter is not an 
impermissible abuse of discretion even though it may work a 
hardship on parties in a particular case. See Kostenbauder v. 
Secretary of Health. Ed. . and Welfare. 71 F. R. D. 449, 453 (M. D. 
Penn. 1976, alflfi Feaster v. Weinberger. 556 F. 2d 565 (3d Cir. 
1977), af f d Kern v. Weinberger. 556 F. 2d 566 (3d Cir. 1977), 
&£L£ Reefl V, Wglnfrgrggr, 556 F. 2d 568 (3d Cir. 1977), aff' d 
Yasenchak v. Weinberger. 556 F. 2d 570 (3d Cir. 1977); see also 
Doe v. Rostker. 89 F. R. D. 158, 163 (N. D. Cal. 1981) ("this court 
has both the duty and the right to ensure compliance with the 
Federal Rules and to take action necessary to achieve the orderly 
and expeditious disposition of cases.") Similarly, Judge Hanson 
did not abuse his discretion by adhering to Rule 4-501 and 
refusing to accept the affidavit of Douglas Allyn. 
Accordingly, Appellants offered no evidence in 
opposition to Respondent' s motion in the case before Judge 
Hanson. Pursuant to Rule 4-501(2)(b) of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, the facts set forth in Respondent's 
-12-
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statement of undisputed facts were deemed admitted for purposes 
of summary judgment because they were not controverted by 
anything offered by Appellants. Under these circumstances, this 
Court repeatedly has held that "the trial court may properly 
conclude that there are no genuine issues of fact unless the face 
of the movant' s affidavit affirmatively discloses the existence 
of such an issue." Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development 
Company. 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983) (footnote omitted); 
£££££&, Cowen and Company v. Atlas Stock Transfer Company, 695 
P. 2d 109, 114 (Utah, 1984); Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire and 
CMfVfrltV Company, 743 P. 2d 1217, 1219 (Utah, 1987). 
Since the Allyns have admitted the execution of the 
underlying loan documents and the default in those loans, there 
is no question that Respondent established its prima facie case 
and, therefore, was entitled to judgment. Further, the Allyns' 
attempt to disclaim personal liability based on an alleged oral 
side agreement is not disclosed on the face of any of the loan 
documents or other evidence submitted by Respondent in support of 
its motion. Thus, in the absence of some counteraffidavit or 
other admissible evidence establishing this alleged agreement, 
Judge Hanson properly concluded that Interlake was entitled to 
summary judgment. As is shown below, even if Judge Hanson had 
allowed the Allyns to submit their opposing memorandum and its 
-13-
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supporting counter affidavit of Douglas Allyn, the affidavit was 
still inadmissible. 
B. Appellants Pytrppytefl Eyiflenge in Opposition to 
Respondent's Motion was Inadmissible. 
Rule 56(e) requires that evidence, including 
counteraffidavits, be admissible before it is admitted in 
opposition to a motion. It is well established that an affidavit 
in opposition to a motion is admissible only where it is made on 
personal knowledge, its contents would be admissible in evidence, 
and the affiant is competent to testify. Trelocrgen, 699 P. 2d at 
748. It is equally well established that an affidavit setting 
forth inadmissible parole evidence used for the purpose of 
varying the terms of a written agreement is inadmissible in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Rainford v. 
Ryttincr. 451 P. 2d 769, 771 (Utah 1969). Moreover, self-serving 
answers to interrogatories which set forth hearsay and 
conclusions are not sufficient to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. 
A & M Enterprises. Inc. v. Hunziker. 482 P. 2d 700, 701-702 (Utah 
1971). 
Appellants contend that the Affidavit of Douglas Allyn, 
and their own unverified admissions raised a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding their personal liability on the subject 
loan documents. To the contrary, this purported evidence was not 
-14-
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admissible and, therefore , did not r a i s e an i s s u e of fact 
precluding entry of summary judgment below. 
1. Tfre AJLlyng' ymygrifiefl flflmiggipng qiq npt 
gpngUtvt? »qmi?sj.i?iQ eyiqenpQt 
As a preliminary matter, the Allyns did not offer their 
admissions in opposition to the motion. Although Interlake did 
introduce certain of Appellants' admissions in support of its 
motion, and those admissions were admissible in evidence as party 
admissions, the Allyns did not and could not have used their 
unverified admissions as evidence against the motion. Thorp 
Sfrlgg Corporation yt pplgge, 453 F. Supp. 196, 202 (W. D. Okla. 
1978) ("It is only when the admission is offered against the 
party who made it that it comes within the exception of the 
hearsay rule for admissions of a party opponent."). Accordingly, 
Rule 56(e)'s requirement that admissible evidence be offered in 
opposition to a motion was not satisfied. 
Plaintiffs rely on p^ <?g yt gpytfrgyp Exprggg Qp. , 409 
F. 2d 331 (7th Cir. 1969) for the proposition that a party may use 
its own admissions to support or oppose a motion for summary 
judgment. However, the facts in Pace are readily distinguishable 
from those of the instant action. In Pace, the defendant moved 
for summary judgment based on the pleadings, the answers to 
plaintiff s requests for admissions, and the defendants' 
deposition. The plaintiff did not ever respond to the 
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defendants' motion for summary judgment. Four months later, the 
plaintiff moved to dismiss her complaint without prejudice. The 
court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied 
plaintiff's motion to dismiss without prejudice on the grounds 
that "under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
to avoid summary judgment it was incumbent upon plaintiff to file 
affidavits or other materials supporting the allegations of the 
complaint. " !£. at 334. In reality, Pace stands for competent 
authority for the proposition that admissible evidence must be 
introduced to contest a motion for summary judgment. The 
decision was based more upon the plaintiff s failure to respond 
than upon the competency of evidence asserted by the defendant. 
Unlike the defendants in the instant action, the 
defendants in Pace at least offered the proposed admissions, 
pleadings and depositions to the Court. In the case at bar, 
Judges Hanson and Rokich had no way of knowing that the 
defendants relied upon their own unverified admissions as grounds 
for contesting plaintiffs motion. In any event, as discussed 
above such unverified admissions would be inadmissible to contest 
plaintiffs motion. 
2. The Mfiflfrvit of PowgXas Keirt hllyn w s 
The only evidence which actually was offered in either 
case was Douglas Allyn' s affidavit which was offered in the case 
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before Judge Rokich. Interlake argued, however, that this 
affidavit lacked adequate foundation for admission, and, further, 
was barred by the parole evidence rule. The Allyns now contend, 
as they did below, that under the rationale of Union Bank v. 
Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985), the Allyn affidavit is not 
barred by the parole evidence rule and creates a genuine issue of 
fact. 
Appellants' reliance on Union Bank is entirely 
misplaced. In that case, the appellants signed a promissory note 
both individually and personally. In addition, one of the 
appellants executed the note as president of a corporation. Upon 
default of the note, the lenders sought enforcement against the 
corporation and the appellants individually. 
In opposition to a motion for summary judgment, 
appellants timely offered separate affidavits opposing the motion 
in which they stated that a bank officer had informed them that 
their signatures were needed to satisfy the bank auditors and the 
bank' s loan committee. They further alleged that this bank 
representative assured them that they would not be personally 
liable and that without such assurances they would not have 
signed the note. Ifl. at 664. 
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court' s decision 
granting summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with its opinion. The remand called for the lower 
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court to first make a determination regarding integration of the 
contract in light of the appellants' affidavits. Once the court 
determined that there was an integrated contract, it next would 
have to consider whether the appellants had established a 
question of material fact relative to their theory of fraudulent 
inducement. Id. at 666-667. 
In contrast, the Appellants here offered a single, 
untimely affidavit that lacks the requisite foundation for 
admission into evidence. The affidavit of Douglas Kent Allyn 
contains several fatal flaws. First, although the affidavit 
purports in paragraph 1 to be made upon personal knowledge, the 
specific allegations contained in paragraph 2, relied upon by 
Douglas Allyn to contest Interlake' s motion for summary judgment, 
are true only to "the best of affiant's understanding and 
knowledge. '• This qualification allows affiant to make certain 
assertions based on his understanding of the facts rather than 
his personal knowledge. Interlake is left to guess which 
assertions, if any, are actually based on Mr. Allyn' s personal 
knowledge as opposed to his mere understanding. Clearly, the 
limiting phrase prevents the affidavit from complying with the 
requirement that affidavits in opposition must be made upon 
personal knowledge. JSfifi Maiorana v. MacDonald. 596 F. 2d 1072, 
1080 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Dibble. 429 F. 2d 598, 601-
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602 (9th Cir. 1970); Carev v. Beans, 500 F. Supp. 580, 583 (E. D. 
Penn. 1980). 
The affidavit itself provides no clues as to the 
affiant' s personal knowledge. The affidavit makes vague 
references to "conversations with Perkins" but fails to specify 
when such conversations were held, who was present (or even if 
the affiant was present), or specifically what was said. The 
affidavit fails to indicate whether the assurances allegedly made 
by Jeff Perkins were made directly to the affiant or through an 
intermediary based on Mr. Allyn' s understanding. 
Second, even assuming the affidavit was based upon the 
personal knowledge of Douglas Allyn, the affidavit does not 
purport to address any representations made by Interlake or Mr. 
Perkins to the other defendants and, consequently, the other 
defendants would remain fully subject to Interlake's motion for 
summary judgment. The affidavit fails to indicate whether Mr. 
Perkins made assurances to the other defendants and, in any 
event, Mr. Allyn would be incapable of testifying about the other 
de fendants' moti vati ons. 
Third, the affidavit does not even set forth the 
requisite elements of a claim of fraudulent inducement. It does 
not, for example, allege that Mr. Allyn would not have executed 
the notes but for the alleged representations of Interlake' s loan 
officer, or that Mr. Allyn' s reliance, if any, on these 
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representations was justifiable in light of the plain and 
unambiguous terms of the notes. In short, the affidavit of 
Douglas Allyn fails as admissible evidence because (1) the facts 
in the affidavit were not asserted as based on personal 
knowledge, (2) the affidavit's allegations are vague and without 
foundation, and (3) the parole evidence rule bars the affidavit's 
admission in light of the affiant' s failure to assert fraudulent 
inducement. 
Significantly, the Allyns made absolutely no effort 
during the pendency of this action to take the deposition of the 
so-called agent of Interlake who allegedly entered into the oral 
agreement regarding no personal liability with Appellants, nor 
did the Allyns conduct any other discovery on this issue. 
Finally, Judge Rokich was free to disregard Allyn' s 
affidavit if he found it inherently unbelievable. Since the 
material facts asserted in Interlake' s memorandum were 
uncontested, the loan documents are clear and unambiguous on 
-20-
G:\WPL\159\00000G3X.W51 
their face and have absolutely no nonrecourse provisions, the 
corporation on whose behalf Allyn purportedly signed the 
documents never existed, and the Appellants had ample opportunity 
to conduct to discovery to produce confirmatory evidence which 
they failed to produce, it clearly was not error for Judge Rokich 
to conclude that Allyn' s affidavit did not rebut the presumptive 
validity and integration of the loan documents nor did it raise a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding some disingenuous and 
self-serving claim of fraudulent inducement. 
This case is also distinguishable from Union Bank in 
that Douglas Allyn signed multiple agreements in his individual 
capacity, not one of which is nonrecourse in the event of 
default. Moreover, Mr. Allyn has contended that he signed in 
behalf of a corporation whose name and reference to which appears 
nowhere on the note. Thus, if Appellant' s disingenuous claim is 
accepted as true, there is no party liable on the note. 
More importantly, there was no evidence offered by 
Appellants to prove the very existence of the corporation on 
whose behalf Allyn purportedly signed the note. Consequently, 
even if Allyn did also sign in a representative capacity as he 
claims in his affidavit, since the note makes absolutely no 
reference to that fact and the corporation on whose behalf he 
allegedly signed has never existed, Allyn would still be 
personally liable on the note. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-403(2)(a) 
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(1980) (an authorized representative that signs in his own name 
"is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the 
person represented nor shows that the representative signed in a 
representative capacity . . . ." ). 
It is equally well established that where a corporation 
is never incorporated, or defectively incorporated, persons who 
execute contracts on behalf of the corporation are personally 
liable for the debts and obligations reflected by those 
agreements. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-139 (1980); Gillham 
Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Ipson. 567 P. 2d 163, 165 (Utah 1977). 
Mr. Allyn signed the relevant Notes twice. Once in an 
individual capacity and once as the representative for a 
corporation that did not exist. Even assuming arguendo that Mr. 
Allyn was fraudulently induced to sign personally through the 
representations of Mr. Perkins, there is absolutely no evidence 
that Mr. Allyn did not fully intend for the supposed corporation 
to be liable. Because the supposed corporation was defective, 
Mr. Allyn is personally liable on the Notes based on his 
representative signature, regardless of any representations that 
may have been made to induce his personal signature through 
assurances that he would not actually be liable based upon his 
pers onal s i gnature. 
These significant distinctions from Union Bank compel a 
different result here. The single flawed affidavit of Douglas 
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Allyn combined with the Allyns' signatures in dual capacities on 
the lone documents mandate that the parole evidence rule apply to 
disqualify the statements made by Mr. Allyn that contradict the 
written documents. Consequently, the affidavit of Douglas Allyn 
was clearly inadmissible for all of the above stated reasons. 
The Allyns failed to produce any admissible evidence in 
opposition to Interlake' s Motion for Summary Judgment. Judge 
Hanson was within his discretion to disallow the submission of 
the Allyns' late-filed memorandum in opposition and affidavit of 
Douglas Allyn. Neither the affidavit of Douglas Allyn based on 
his "understanding and knowledge" nor the unverified, unoffered 
admissions of the Allyns qualify as admissible evidence. 
Because Interlake presented a prima facie case to 
support its Motion for Summary Judgment which was not overcome by 
any admissible evidence submitted by the Allyns, the lower 
courts' grant of summary judgment was appropriately granted. 
Therefore, Interlake respectfully requests that the Allyns appeal 
be dismissed, that the lower courts' grant of summary judgment be 
affirmed, and that Interlake be awarded its costs associated with 
defending against this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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DATED this 24th day of October, 1990. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Joltn A. /^Anders o% 
Doug Thomas 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
2-<f foregoing Motion was mailed, postage prepaid, this 
October, 1990, to the following: 
day of 
John Burton Anderson, Esq. 
ANDERSON & DUNN 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, "IJtah 84121 
AJa^A^ £ , /^ L 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John A. Anderson. Bar No. 4464 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba Interlake Thrift -
Mortgage Division, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS 
KENT ALLYN dba J & D 
PROPERTIES, a California 
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT 
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN 
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND 
COMPANY, a California 
Partnership, 
Defendants. 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba Interlake Thrift -
Mortgage Division, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN B. SWANK an individual, 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN, and 
RICHARD JOHN ALLYN, SR., 
dba ALLYN AND COMPANY, a 
Partnership; all dba Parkway 
Village, a Joint Venture, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-6724 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Civil No. C86-6725 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
EXHIBIT A 
Plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, dba Interlake 
Thrift - Mortgage Division ("Interlake") submits the following 
points and authorities in support of its motions for summary 
judgment and default judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
These are consolidated foreclosure actions relating to 
certain real property situated at approximately 1700 South 1000 
West in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Plaintiff is the 
beneficiary under certain trust deeds encumbering this real 
property. Defendants are the makers of certain Promissory 
Notes giving rise to the Trust Deeds, and also the trustors 
pursuant to said Trust Deeds. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, dba Interlake 
Thrift - Mortgage Division ("Interlake") is a Utah corporation 
where its principal place of business is in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Grant Thornton is the court appointed liquidator/ 
receiver of USA Financial Corporation. (Aff. of C. Davis 11 3.) 
2. Defendant John B. Swank, whose default was entered 
in this consolidated action by the Clerk of this Court on 
February 23, 1989, is a resident of the State of California. 
3. Defendants Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John 
Allyn, Sr., are residents of the State of California. Allyn 
and Company is a California general partnership consisting of 
Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John Allyn, Sr. (Answer to 
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Complaint C86-6724 at H 3 and Answer to Complaint C86-6725 at 
11 3.) 
Parkway Village Loan Nos. L100141 and 9141 
4. On or about May 29, 1985, defendants Douglas Allyn 
and Richard Allyn executed that certain Promissory Note in the 
principal amount of Two Hundred Eight Thousand Five Hundred and 
No/100 Dollars ($208,500.00) payable to Interlake Thrift, a 
true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" to 
Complaint C86-6724. The Allyns executed this Promissory Note 
both individually and in behalf of Allyn and Company, a 
California general partnership. (Exhibit "A" to Complaint 
C86-6724; Amended Response to Request for Admissions, Request 
Nos. 1 through 4.) 
5. The subject Promissory Note was also executed in 
behalf of John B. Swank, as a partner in Parkway Village, a 
joint venture involving Swank, the Allyns, and Allyn and 
Company. (Amended Response, to Request for Admissions, Request 
No. 5.) 
6. As security for the Promissory Note, on or about 
May, 1985, Richard Allyn also executed that certain Deed of 
Trust with Assignment of Rents, a true and correct copy of 
which is attached to Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "B,M 
encumbering certain real property situated in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, which is more particularly described therein. 
This Trust Deed was recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
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Office on October 10, 1985 as Entry No. 4149379 at Book 5699, 
Page 619. Allyn executed this Deed of Trust in behalf of the 
defendants and also in behalf of Parkway Village. (Amended 
Response to Request for Admissions, Request Nos. 6 through 8.) 
7. On June 10, 1985, Douglas Allyn executed that 
certain Additional Funds Agreement, a true and correct copy 
which is attached to Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "C," in the 
principal amount of Twenty-Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars 
($25,000.00). Douglas Allyn executed this Additional Funds 
Agreement in behalf of himself, Richard Allyn, Allyn and 
Company and Parkway Village. (Amended Response to Request for 
Admissions, Request Nos. 9 through 12.) 
8. On or about September 23, 1985, Richard Allyn 
executed that certain Additional Funds Agreement, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached to Complaint C86-6724 as 
Exhibit MD,M in the principal amount of Sixty-Two Thousand Five 
Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($62,500.00). Allyn executed this 
second Additional Funds Agreement for and in behalf of himself, 
Douglas Allyn, Allyn and Company, and Parkway Village. 
(Amended Response to Request for Admissions, Request Nos. 13 
through 15.) 
9. On February 13, 1986, Douglas Allyn executed that 
certain Renewal Agreement, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached to Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "E," renewing loan 
L100141 for the period stated therein. Douglas Allyn executed 
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this Renewal Agreement in behalf the defendants and Parkway 
Village. (Amended Response to Request for Admissions, Request 
Nos. 16 through 18. ) 
10. On November 29, 1985, Richard Allyn and Douglas 
Allyn executed that certain Renewal Agreement, both 
individually and as partners in Allyn and Company, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached to Complaint C86-6724 as 
Exhibit MF." (Amended Response to Request for Admissions, 
Requests Nos. 19 through 26.) 
11. On March 31, 1986, Douglas Allyn and Richard 
Allyn, both individually and in behalf of Allyn and Company, 
executed a second Promissory Note in the principal amount of 
One Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars 
($135,000.00) payable to Interlake Thrift. A true and correct 
copy of this second Promissory Note is attached to Complaint 
C86-6724 as Exhibit "G." 
12. As security for this second Promissory Note, on 
March 31, 1986, Douglas Allyn and Richard Allyn, both 
individually and in behalf of Allyn and Company, executed that 
certain Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached to Complaint C86-6724 as 
Exhibit "H," encumbering certain real property situated in Salt: 
Lake County, State of Utah which is more particularly described 
therein. This second Trust Deed was recorded in the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's Office on May 21, 1986 as Entry No. 4248675 
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at Book 5769, Page 1122. This second Deed of Trust encumbers 
the same real property encumbered by the original Deed of Trust 
described in Paragraph 6 above. (Aff. of C. Davis at 11 10.) 
13. The proceeds from this second Promissory Note 
were used to pay down the amount owed by defendants1 pursuant 
to the original Promissory Noted dated May 29, 1985. (Aff. of 
C. Davis at U 9.) 
14. Defendants failed to make payments according to 
the requirements of the original Promissory Note and Renewal 
Agreements attached as Exhibits A, C, D, E and F to Complaint 
C86-6724, and are in default thereunder. (Amended Response to 
Request for Admissions, Request Nos. 63 through 65; Aff. of C. 
Davis at 1F 11. ) 
15. As of November 1, 1989, the amount due and owing 
on the first Promissory Note was Three Hundred Forty-Seven 
Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Two and 73/100 Dollars 
($347,652.73), consisting of $223,967.89 in principal and 
$123,684.84 in accrued interest. (Aff. of C. Davis at 11 12.) 
16. The principal amount due on the first Promissory 
Note includes the original loan amount, less the pay down 
resulting from the second loan, plus interest which had accrued 
to and including December 31. 1987. The separate accrued 
interest figure reflects interest which has accrued from 
January 1, 1988 at the floor rate of 13% per annum (rather than 
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the penalty rate of 18%). The per diem rate on this Promissory 
Note is $79.77. (Aff. of C. Davis at IT 13.) 
17. Defendants also failed to make payments according 
to requirements of the second Promissory Note (Exhibit T ) , 
and are in default thereunder. (Aff. of C. Davis at 11 14.) 
18. As of November 1, 1989, the amount due on the 
second Promissory Note dated March 31, 1986 was One Hundred 
Ninety-Four Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty and 83/100 Dollars 
($194,760.83), consisting of $144,484.27 principal and 
$50,276.56 in accrued interest. The per diem rate on this 
second Promissory Note is $51.46. (Aff. of C. Davis at 1T 15.) 
19. The principal amount due on the second Promissory 
Note reflects the original amount of the loan plus accrued 
interest to and including December 31, 1987. The separate 
accrued interest figure reflects interest which has accrued 
from January 1, 1988 at the floor rate of 13% per annum (rather 
than the penalty rate of 18%). (Aff. of C. Davis at U 16.) 
Parkway Village Loan Nos. L100142 and 9142 
20. On May 29, 1985, Defendant John B. Swank executed 
a Promissory Note in the principal amount of Four Hundred 
Twelve Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($412,000.00) payable to 
Interlake Thrift, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
to Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "A." (Aff. of C. Davis at 
11 17.) 
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21. As security for this loan, on or about May 29, 
1985, Swank also executed that certain Deed of Trust with 
Assignment of Rents, a true and correct copy of whi is 
attached to Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "B," encumbering 
certain real property situated at approximately 1700 South 1000 
West, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which is more 
particularly described therein. This Trust Deed was recorded 
in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on October 10, 1985 
as Entry No. 4149377 at Book 5899, Page 612. This Deed of 
Trust encumbers property adjacent to that covered by the Allyn 
Deeds of Trust. (Aff. of C. Davis at H 18.) 
22. Swank executed a Renewal Agreement, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached to Complaint C86-6725 as 
Exhibit "C," extending the payment date on the original 
Promissory Note to July 15, 1986 on the conditions set forth 
therein. (Aff. of C. Davis at If 19.) 
23. On March 31, 1986, Swank executed a second 
Promissory Note, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
to Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit MD,H payable to Interlake 
Thrift in the principal amount of Forty-Three Thousand and 
No/100 Dollars ($43,000.00). (Aff. of C. Davis at 1T 20.) 
24. The Second Promissory Note in the principal 
amount of Forty-Three Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($43,000.00) 
was used to a pay down the original Promissory Note of May 29, 
1985. (Aff. of C. Davis at 1T 20.) 
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25. As security for this second Promissory Note, on 
March 31, 1986, Swank also executed that certain Deed of Trust 
with Assignment of Rents, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached to Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "E," encumbering the 
same real property encumbered by the original Deed of Trust 
dated May 29, 1985. This second Trust Deed was recorded in the 
Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on July 15, 1985 as Entry 
No. 4278658 at Book 5790, Page 2068. (Aff. of C. Davis at 
11 21.) 
26. Defendants failed to make payments according to 
the requirements of the first Promissory Note dated May 29, 
1985 in the principal amount of $412,000.00 and are in default 
thereunder. (Aff. of C. Davis at 11 22.) 
27. As of November 1, 1989, the amount due and owing 
on the Promissory Note dated May 29, 1985 (Exhibit "A" to 
Complaint C86-6725) was Six Hundred Thirty Thousand Two Hundred 
Thirty-Eight and 58/100 Dollars ($630,238.58), consisting of 
$467,554.88 in principal together with accrued interest of 
$162,683.70. (Aff. of C. Davis at 11 23.) 
28. The principal amount of the first Promissory Note 
includes the original loan amount, less the pay down, together 
with accrued interest to and including December 31, 1987. The 
separate accrued interest figure reflects interest which has 
accrued from January 1, 1988 at the floor rate of 13% per annum 
(rather than the penalty rate of 18% per annum). The per diem 
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rate of interest on the first Promissory Note is $166.53. 
(Aff. of C. Davis at U 24.) 
29. Defendants also failed to make payments according 
to the requirements of the second Promissory Note date March 
31, 1986 (Exhibit "EM to Complaint C86-6725), and are in 
default thereunder. (Aff. of C. Davis at IT 25.) 
30. As of November 1, 1989, the amount due and owing 
on the second Promissory Note dated March 31, 1986 (Exhibit "DM 
to Complaint C86-6725) was Sixty-One Thousand Five Hundred 
Eighty and 81/100 Dollars ($61,580.81), consisting of principal 
in the amount of $45,684.06 together with accrued interest of 
$15,896.75. (Aff. of C. Davis at H 26.) 
31. The principal amount due on the second Promissory 
Note includes the original loan amount together with accrued 
interest to and including December 31, 1987. The separate 
accrued interest figure reflects interest which has accrued 
since January 1, 1988 at the floor rate of 13% per annum 
(rather than the penalty rate of 18% per annum). The per diem 
rate of interest on the second Promissory Note is $16.27. 
(Aff. of C. Davis at IT 27.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANT JOHN SWANK. 
Defendant John Swank's default was taken pursuant to 
Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 
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55(b), Interlake is entitled to a default judgment against 
Swank adjudging the total amount due and owing by him to 
Interlake on Parkway Village Loan Nos. L100142 and 9142 in the 
total amount of $61,819.39, together with costs, attorneys' 
fees and interest which it continues to accrue pursuant to the 
Promissory Notes at the rate of at lease 13% per annum. 
Interlake is further entitled to an order directing 
the sale of the mortgaged property to satisfy said amount and 
all accrued and accruing costs and interest, and directing the 
sheriff to proceed to sell the same according to the provisions 
of law relating to sales on execution, and also to a special 
execution order of sale to be issued for that purpose pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 et seq. 
In the event the proceeds from the sale of the trust 
deed property are insufficient, and a balance still remains 
due, a deficiency judgment must also be docketed by the Clerk 
in the amount of the deficiency and a writ of execution issued 
for such balance pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-2. 
II. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS DOUGLAS ALLYN, RICHARD ALLYN, AND ALLYN AND 
COMPANY. 
Plaintiff is also entitled pursuant to Rule 56(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to a judgment against 
defendants Douglas Allyn, Richard Allyn, and Allyn and Company 
on Parkway Village Loan Nos. L100141 and 9141. There are no 
disputed issues of material fact with respect to the execution 
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of said notes or the security agreements encumbering the Trust 
Deed property. Further, there is no dispute regarding 
defendants* default under both of these Parkway Village Notes, 
or with respect to the present amounts of the obligations 
secured by the Trust Deed property. Accordingly, summary 
judgment should be granted to plaintiff because it is clear 
from these undisputed facts that the defendants cannot prevail 
as a matter of law and that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against the Allyns 
and Allyn and Company adjudging the amount due under Parkway 
Village Loan Nos. L100141 dated May 29, 1985 and the Additional 
Funds Agreements dated June 10, 1985 and September 23, 1985 in 
the total amount of $347,652.73, together with costs, 
attorneys' fees and accrued interest. Plaintiff is also 
entitled to an order directing the sale of the Trust Deed 
property to satisfy said amount, and directing the sheriff to 
proceed to sell the same according to the provisions of law 
relating to sales on execution, and to a special execution 
order of sale for that purpose pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-37-1. In the event the proceeds from the sale are 
insufficient to satisfy this judgment, and a balance still 
remains due, a deficiency judgment must thereafter be docketed 
by the Clerk in the amount of the deficiency and a writ of 
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execution issued for such balance pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-37-2. 
Plaintiff is also entitled to a judgment against the 
Allyns and Allyn and Company adjudging the amount due under 
Parkway Village Loan No. 9141 dated March 31, 1986 in the 
amount of $242,773.15, together with costs, attorneys' fees and 
accrued interest. Plaintiff is also entitled to an order 
directing the sale of the trust deed property to satisfy said 
amount and directing the sheriff to proceed to sell the same 
according to the provisions of law relating to sales on 
execution, and to a special execution order of sale for that 
purpose pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1. In the event the 
proceeds from this sale are insufficient to satisfy this 
judgment, and a balance still remains due, a deficiency 
judgment must thereafter be docketed by the Clerk and a writ of 
execution issued for such balance pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-37-2. 
III. PLAINTIFF'S LIENS AGAINST THE TRUST DEED PROPERTY ARE 
SENIOR AND SUPERIOR TO ANY OTHER LIENS. 
Finally, there are no persons holding a conveyance 
from or under the mortgagor of the subject property, or having 
a lien thereon, which conveyance or lien appeared of record at 
the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office at the time this action 
was commenced and, therefore, plaintiff is also entitled to an 
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REQOBST NO. 2: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy 
of a Promissory Note executed by Defendant Richard John Allyn, 
Sr. on or about May 29, 1985. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn and 
Richard John Allyn executed said Exhibit "A" for and in behalf 
of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: Admit that Defendants signed for Allyn and 
Company to obtain funding to complete the Parkway Village 
project. According to Jeff Perkins, Interlake could not lend 
Swank more money because Swank's loan amount would then exceed 
it's legal limits. Interlake needed to make part of the loan 
to another company. Allyn and Company consented to signing for 
part of the loan after receiving assurances from Perkins that 
Richard J. Allyn and Douglas Kent Allyn would not be personally 
liable and that if there was a problem Interlake would simply 
take the property back without any personal liability. Douglas 
Kent Allyn and John Swank were working together on the Parkway 
Village project. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn and 
Richard John Allyn executed said Exhibit "A" for and in behalf 
of Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
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REQOBST NO. 5: Admit that John 3. Swank was a 
partner in Parkway Village, a joint venture, along with Douglas 
Kent Allyn and Richard John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn was working 
with John B. Swank on a retainer basis with the anticipation 
that Allyn would receive a certain percentage of the Parkway 
Village project once it was put together. 
REQUEST NO. 6: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy 
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rights executed by 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. on or about May 29, 1985. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr., 
executed said Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 8: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr., 
executed said Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Allyn and 
Company. 
ANSWER: Admit, see paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 9: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit MCn is a true and correct copy 
of an Additional Funds Agreement executed by Douglas Kent 
Allyn on or about June 10, 1985. 
ANSWER: Admit 
-4-
R2QUBST NO* 10: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 a Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of 
an Additional Funds Agreement executed by Richard John Allyn, 
Sr, on or about June 10/ 1985. 
ANSWER: Admit that Exhibit "C" is a true and correct 
copy, but deny execution of document by Richard J. Allyn. 
Douglas Kent Allyn is the one who actually executed the document 
for Richard J. Allyn. 
REQUEST NO. 11: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn and 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. executed said Exhibit "C" for and in 
behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn signed for 
Richard J. Allyn for Allyn & Company. See paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 12: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn and 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. executed said Exhibit "C" for and in 
behalf of Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 11 above. 
REQUEST NO. 13: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy 
of an Additional Funds Agreement executed by Richard Jonn 
Allyn, Sr. on or about September 23, 1985. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 14: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed said Exhibit "D" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
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RBQUEST HO. 15s Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed said Exhibit "D" for and in behalf of Allyn and 
Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO* 16s Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "E" is a true and correct copy 
of a Renewal Agreement executed by Douglas Kent Allyn on 
February 13, 1986. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 17: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit "E" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 18: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit ME" for and in behalf of Allyn and 
Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 19: Admit the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy 
of a Renewal Agreement executed by Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
on or about November 29, 1985. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 20: Admit the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy 
of a Renewal Agreement executed by Douglas Kent Allyn on or 
about November 29, 1985. 
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ANSWERs Admit 
REQUEST HO, 21: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of Allyn and 
Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 22: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 23: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr., 
executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWER: Deny. Although the document shows signing 
as an individual, Defendant was signing for the partnership. 
According to Jeff Perkins, there was to be no personal liability 
of the Defendants. 
REQUEST NO. 24: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of Allyn and Company. 
ANSWERS See paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 25: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit "F" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 3 above. 
REQUEST NO. 26: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit HF" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 23 above* 
REQUEST NO. 27: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "G" is a true and correct copy 
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of a Promissory Note executed by Richard John Allyn, Sr. on or 
about March 31, 1986. 
ANSWER: Defendants do not recall this document and 
therefore deny. 
REQUEST NO. 28: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "G" is a true and correct copy 
of a Promissory Note executed by Douglas Kent Allyn on or 
about March 31, 1986. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 29: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed said Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of Allyn and 
Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 30: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed said Exhibit "Gn for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 31: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed said Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 32: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 33: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn, Sr. 
executed Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
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REQUBST NO. 34: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit "G" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 35: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "H" is a true and correct copy 
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents executed by 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. on or about March 31, 1986. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 36: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "H" is a true and correct copy 
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents executed by 
Douglas Kent Allyn on or about March 31, 1986. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST MO. 37: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 38: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWERS See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 39: Admit that Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
executed Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWERS See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 40: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of Allyn and 
Company. 
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AMSWBRi See paragraph 27 above, 
REQUEST NO. 41: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit "H" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 42: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed said Exhibit MH" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above, 
REQUEST NO. 43: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy 
of a Promissory Note executed by John B. Swank on or about May 
29, 1985. 
ANSWERt Defendant Douglas Kent Allyn was present 
when many of the documents were signed by John B. Swank and to 
the best of his recollection admits that Mr. Swank executed 
this document. 
REQUEST HO. 44: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "A" for and in behalf of Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard 
John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a Allyn and Company. 
ANSWERS Deny. Originally, the purchaser of the 
Parkway Property was to be in a corporate name or Swanks name. 
Jeff Perkins indicated, however, that the Plaintiff could not 
do that because the loan amount would exceed its legal limit. 
As explained in paragraph 3 above, Allyn and Company signed on 
the previous documents responded to. Swank, however, was not 
authorized to sign for Allyn and Company, Douglas Kent Allyn 
or Richard J. Allyn. 
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RBQUEST NO. 45: Admit that Swank executed said Exhibit 
"A" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWER: Defendant can only speculate Mr. Swank's 
intent and therefore denies, letting the document speak for 
itself. See also paragraph 44 above. 
REQUEST NO. 46: Admit that Swank executed said Exhibit 
"A" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 45 above. 
REQUEST NO. 47: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy 
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents executed by John 
B. Swank on or about May 29, 1985. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 43 above. 
REQUEST NO. 48: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard 
John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a/ Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 44 above. 
REQUEST NO. 49: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 4 5 above. 
REQUEST NO. 50: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 45 above. 
REQUEST NO. 51: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy 
of a Renewal Agreement executed by John B. Swank. 
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ANSWER: See paragraph 43 above. 
REQUEST NO. 52: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "C" for and in behalf of Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard 
John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 44 above. 
REQUEST NO. 53: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "C" for and in behalf of himself. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 45 above. 
REQUEST NO. 54: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "B" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 45 above. 
REQUEST NO. 55: Admit that the document attached to 
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy 
of a Promissory Note executed by John B. Swank on or about 
March 31, 1986. 
ANSWERS See paragraph 43 above. 
REQUEST NO. 56: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "D" for and in behalf of Richard John Allyn, Sr. and 
Douglas Kent Allyn, d/b/a Allyn and Company. 
ANSWERS See paragraph 44 above. 
REQUEST NO. 57: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "D" for and in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWERS See paragraph 45 above. 
REQUEST NO. 58: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "D" for in behalf of himself. 
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ANSWSI: See paragraph 45 above. 
REQUEST NO. 59: Admit that the documents attached to 
Complaint C86-6725 as Exhibit "E" is a true and correct copy 
of a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents executed by John 
B. Swank on or about March 31, 1986• 
ANSWER: See paragraph 43 above. 
REQUEST NO. 60: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "E" for and in behalf of Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard 
John Allyn, Sr., d/b/a Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 44 above. 
REQUEST NO. 61: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "E" for in behalf of Parkway Village. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 45 above. 
REQUEST NO. 62: Admit that Swank executed said 
Exhibit "E" for in behalf of Allyn and Company. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 44 above. 
REQUEST NO. 63: Admit that Defendants failed to make 
payments according to the requirements of Exhibit "A" to 
Complaint C86-6724. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 64: Admit that Defendants failed to make 
payments according to the requirements of Exhibit "C" to 
Complaint C86-6724. 
ANSWER: Admit 
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RBQUBST NO. 65: Admit that Defendants failed to make 
payments according to the requirements of Exhibit "D" to 
Complaint C86-6724. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 66: Admit that Defendants failed to make 
payments according to the requirements of Exhibit "G" to 
Complaint C86-6724. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 27 above. 
REQUEST NO. 67: Admit that Defendants failed to make 
payments according to the requirements of Exhibit "A" to 
Complaint C86-6724. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 68: Admit that Defendants failed to make 
payments according to the requirements of Exhibit "D" to 
Complaint C86-6724. 
ANSWER: Admit 
DATED this J:J* day of June, 1988, 
erson ^X 
for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF HANS-DELIVERY 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Amended Response to Requests for 
Admissions were -haad- delivered on the VV'" day of June, 1988, 
- / / «.«* «.... v. v. . 
to John A. Anderson, VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 6 MCCARTHY at 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt/Lake City, UtaX 84145. 
/ / 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY. CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba Interlake Thrift -
Mortgage Division, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS 
KENT ALLYN dba J & D 
PROPERTIES, a California 
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT 
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN 
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND 
COMPANY, a California 
Partnership, 
Defendants. 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba Interlake Thrift -
Mortgage Division, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN B. SWANK an individual, 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN, and 
RICHARD JOHN ALLYN, SR., 
dba ALLYN AND COMPANY, a 
Partnership: all dba Parkway 
Village, a Joint Venture, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JOHN A. ANDERSON 
Civil No. C86-6724 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Civil No. C86-6725 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
John A. Anderson, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am a resident of the State of Utah, over the age 
of 18, and otherwise competent to make this affidavit. Except 
those matters stated on information and belief, which I believe 
to be true, the matters set forth below are based on my 
personal knowledge, and if called as a witness, I could and 
would competently testify thereto. 
2. I am a shareholder in the law firm of Van Cott, 
Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy ("Van Cott,f) in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar and 
I am qualified to practice before all courts of the State of 
Utah. 
3. Van Cott has been retained by Grant Thornton, the 
court appointed receiver/liquidator of plaintiff USA Financial 
Corporation dba Interlake Thrift - Mortgage Division 
("Interlake") to prosecute the present action. I am the 
attorney now primarily responsible for the prosecution of said 
action. In such capacity, I am familiar with the costs which 
have been advanced and the attorneys' fees charged, and to be 
charged in collecting the amounts due under the subject 
Promissory Notes and in foreclosing the subject Trust Deeds by 
Van Cott. 
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4. The plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees is 
based on the express terms of the Promissory Notes and Trust 
Deeds which are part of Parkway Village Loan Nos. L100141, 
L100142, 941, and 942, and which are described in greater 
detail in the accompanying memorandum of points and 
authorities. Each of these Notes and Trust Deeds provides for 
the payment of costs and attorneys' fees upon default in the 
terms thereof. 
5. The attorneys' fees which plaintiff has incurred 
for services through November 1, 1989 in collecting the amounts 
due under the subject Promissory Notes and foreclosing the 
subject Trust Deeds is $9,942.50, based on 102.00 hours of work 
by the following attorneys: 
Patricia Olsen 17.00 hours at $80.00 per hour 
Patricia Olsen 14.00 hours at $85.00 per hour 
Thomas T. Billings 3.00 hours at $130.00 per hour 
Thomas T. Billings 3.50 hours at $140.00 per hour 
John A. Anderson 26.00 hours at $95.00 per hour 
John A. Anderson 38.50 hours at $105.00 per hour 
These hourly rates are below the normal hourly rate charged by 
attorneys at Van Cott and are reasonable fees for comparable 
legal services. 
6. These services represent time spent in 
investigation of facts, legal research, drafting of the 
Complaint, discovery matters, preparation of the motion for 
summary judgment and related pleadings, interoffice 
conferences, conferences with Grant Thornton and its 
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representatives, preparation of correspondence and telephone 
conferences with plaintiff, third parties and opposing counsel, 
and protection of the Trust Deed Property. 
7. Assuming that those services are required beyond 
final preparation of the motion for summary judgment after 
November 1, 1989, responding to defendants' opposition to said 
motion, if any, appearing and arguing the motion, preparing the 
appropriate order and documents relating to the sale of 
collateral and attending the sheriff's sale, the additional 
attorneys' fees to be charged to plaintiff will be 
approximately $2,000.00. 
8. All of said services rendered or to be rendered by 
Van Cott in behalf of plaintiff have been reasonably necessary 
in the exercise of diligence and care to the collection of the 
subject Promissory Notes, the protection and foreclosure of the 
subject Trust Deeds and matters otherwise germane to this 
action. 
DATED t h i s day of November. A 8 8 9 . 
lerson 
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ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me 
this \Q\IT\ day of November, 1989, by John A. Anderson. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
<sLSTZ.'\_J 
Res 
My Commission Expires 
iding at: fj^U^d / ^M^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing Affidavit of John A. Anderson to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, this fl>W day of ^^•dt^^y^^ , 
1989, to the following: 
John B. Swank 
114 Flag Way 
Pasa Robles, California 93447 
Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Allyn and Company 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92 
7007A 
110389 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, ) 
dba Interlake Thrift - ) 
Mortgage Division, a Utah ) AFFIDAVIT OF 
corporation, ) CHRIS DAVIS 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS ) 
KENT ALLYN dba J & D ) 
PROPERTIES, a California ) 
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT ) 
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN ) 
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND ) Civil No. C86-6724 
COMPANY, a California ) 
Partnership, ) Honorable Timothy R. Hansoi 
Defendants. ) 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba Interlake Thrift -
Mortgage Division, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN B. SWANK an individual, 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN, and 
RICHARD JOHN ALLYN, SR., 
dba ALLYN AND COMPANY, a 
Partnership; all dba Parkway 
Village, a Joint Venture, 
Civil No. C86-6725 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Chris Davis, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am a resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, over the age of 18, and otherwise competent to make this 
affidavit. Except those matters stated on information and 
belief, which I believe to be true, the matters set forth below 
are based on my personal knowledge, and if called as a witness, 
I could and would competently testify thereto. 
2. I was employed by Interlake Thrift as the Office 
Manager of the Mortgage Division from approximately January, 
1983 to June, 1985. In that capacity, I familiarized myself 
with the business records of Interlake Thrift, including the 
records maintained by Interlake Thrift in the regular and 
ordinary course of its business relating to loan transactions 
such as those at issue in the present lawsuit. 
3. On July 1, 1987, Grant Thornton was appointed as 
the receiver/liquidator of plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, 
dba Interlake Thrift -' Mortgage Division. 
4. I have been employed as Operations Manager of 
Interim* Thrift from kv^ust, VJ&7 to the preset. IY\ that 
capacity, I have access to and am familiar with the business 
records of Interlake Thrift which it has maintained in the 
regular and ordinary course of its business to reflect loan 
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transactions such as those at issue in the present lawsuit. My 
job responsibilities include, among other things, supervision 
and collection of Interlake Thrift's delinquent loan accounts. 
Parkway Village Loan Nos. L100141 and 9141 
5. I have reviewed and am personally familiar with 
Interlake Thrift's records concerning Loan No. L100141, which 
relates to that certain Promissory Note dated May 29, 1985 in 
the principal amount of Two Hundred Eight Thousand Five Hundred 
and No/100 Dollars ($208,500.00) payable to Interlake Thrift by 
Douglas Allyn, Richard Allyn and/or Allyn and Company, a true 
and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" to 
Complaint C86-6724. The records of Interlake Thrift reflect 
that this loan amount was disbursed to or for the benefit of 
the makers, Douglas Allyn, Richard Allyn and/or Allyn and 
Company, a California general partnership, on or about May 29, 
1985. 
6. As security for this Promissory Note, on or about 
May 29, 1985• Richard Allyn also executed that certain Deed of 
Trust, a true and correct copy of which is attached to 
Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "B,M encumbering certain real 
property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which is 
more particularly described therein. This property is commonly 
referred to as Parkway Village, 1092 and 1093 Gamble Place. 
7. Interlake Thrift Loan No. L100141 also includes 
funds disbursed on or about June 10, 1985 pursuant to that 
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certain Additional Funds Agreement in the principal amount of 
$25,000 payable to Interlake Thrift, a true and correct copy of 
which is attached to Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "C." 
Interlake Thrift's records reflect that the full amount of 
these additional funds was disbursed to or for the benefit of 
defendants on or about June 10, 1985. 
8. Interlake Thrift Loan No. L100141 also includes 
funds disbursed on or about September 23, 1985 pursuant to that 
certain Additional Funds Agreement in the principal amount of 
$62,500 payable to Interlake Thrift, a true and correct copy of 
which is attached to Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "D." 
Interlake Thrift's records reflect that the full amount of 
these additional funds was disbursed to or for the benefit of 
defendants on or about September 23, 1985. 
9. On or about March 31, 1986, Douglas Allyn and 
Richard Allyn, both individually and in behalf of Allyn and 
Company, executed a second Promissory Note in the principal 
arount of $135,000.00 payable to Interlake Thrift, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached to complaint C86-6724 as 
Exhibit "G." Interlake Thrifts' records reflect that this 
second loan was used to pay down the then current balance of 
Interlake Thrift Loan No. L100141. This second loan generated 
a separate accounting under Interlake Thrift Loan No. 9141. 
10. As security for the second Promissory Note, on 
March 31, 1986, Douglas Allyn and Richard Allyn, both 
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individually and in behalf of Allyn and Company executed that 
certain Deed of Trust, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached to Complaint C86-6724 as Exhibit "H," encumbering the 
Parkway Village property covered by the earlier Deed of Trust 
(Exhibit "B"). 
11. Defendants have failed to make payments according 
to the requirements of the original Promissory Note, Additional 
Funds Agreements and Renewal Agreements attached as Exhibits A, 
C, D, E and F to Complaint C86-6724, and are in default 
thereunder. 
12. As of November 1, 1989, the amount due and owing 
on the first Promissory Note was $347,652.73, which includes a 
principal balance of $223,967.89 and $123,684.84 in accrued 
interest. 
13. The principal amount due on the first Promissory 
Note includes the original loan amount and costs, less the pay 
down resulting from Loan 9141, together with interest which had 
accrued to and including December 31, 1987. Thereafter, 
Interlake Thrift's records were computerized and a separate 
interest balance was calculated with respect to said Note. The 
separate accrued interest figure reflects interest which has 
accrued since January 1, 1988 at the floor rate of 13% (rather 
than the penalty rate of 18% set forth in the Promissory 
Note). The per diem rate on the original Promissory Note is 
$79.77. 
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14. Defendants have also failed to make payments 
according to the requirements of the second Promissory Note 
dated March 31, 1986 (Exhibit "G"), and are in default 
thereunder. 
15. As of November 1, 1989, the amount due and owing 
on the second Promissory Note was $194,760.83, which includes 
the principal balance of $144,484.27 and $50,276.56 in accrued 
interest. 
16. The principal amount due on the second Promissory 
Note reflects the original amount of the loan and costs 
together with accrued interest to and including December 31, 
1987. Thereafter, Interlake Thrift's records were computerized 
and a separate interest balance was calculated with respect to 
said Note. The separate accrued interest figure reflects 
interest which has accrued since January 1, 1988 at the floor 
rate of 13% per annum (rather than the penalty rate of 18% per 
annum set forth in the Promissory Note). The per diem rate on 
this second Promissory Note is $51.46. 
Parkway Village Loan Nos. L100142 and 9142 
17. I have also reviewed and am familiar with 
Interlake Thrift's records concerning Loan No. L100142, which 
relates to that certain Promissory Note dated May 29, 1985 in 
the principal amount of $412,000.00 payable to Interlake Thrift 
by John Swank. Interlake Thrift's records reflect that the 
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full proceeds of this loan in the amount of $412,000.00 were 
disbursed to or for the benefit of John Swank on or about May 
29, 1985. 
18. As security for this Promissory Note, on May 29, 
1985, Swank also executed that certain Deed of Trust, a true 
and correct copy of which is attached to Complaint C86-6725 as 
Exhibit "B" encumbering certain real property situated at 
approximately 1700 South 1000 West, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, which is more particularly described therein, and which 
is commonly known as Parkway Village, 1092 and 1093 Gamble 
Place. This Deed of Trust encumbers real property situated 
adjacent to that covered by the Allyn Deeds of Trust described 
above. 
19. Swank thereafter executed a Renewal Agreement, a 
true and correct copy of which is attached to Complaint 
C86-6725 as Exhibit MC,,f extending the payment date on the 
original Promissory Note to July 15, 1986 on the condition set 
forth therein, 
20. I have also reviewed and familiar with Interlake 
Thrift's records concerning Loan No. 9142 which relates to that 
certain Promissory Note dated March 31, 1986 in the principal 
amount of $43,000.00 payable to Interlake Thrift by John Swank, 
a true and correct copy of which is attached to Complaint 
C86-6725 as Exhibit "D." Interlake Thrift's records reflect 
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that the full amount of this second loan of $43,000.00 was 
disbursed for the benefit of John Swank on or about March 31, 
1986, and was used as a pay down of the original Promissory 
Note of May 29, 1985. 
21. As security for the second Promissory Note, on 
March 31, 1986, Swank also executed that certain Deed of Trust, 
a true and correct copy of which is attached to Complaint 
C86-6725 as Exhibit "E," encumbering the same Parkway Village 
Property identified in Exhibit "B" to Complaint C86-6725. 
22. Defendants have failed to make payments according 
to the requirements of the first Promissory Noted dated May 29, 
1985 in the principal amount of $412,000.00 and are in default 
thereunder. 
23. As of November 1, 1989, the amount due and owing 
on the Promissory Note dated May 29, 1985 (Exhibit "A" to 
Complaint C86-6725) was $630,238.58, which includes the 
principal balance of $467,554.88 and accrued interest of 
$162,683.70. 
24. The principal amount of the first Promissory Note 
on Loan No. L100142 dated May 29, 1985, includes the original 
loan amount and costs, less the pay down, together with accrued 
interest to and including December 31, 1987. Thereafter, 
Interlake Thrift's records were computerized and a separate 
interest balance was calcualted with respect to said Note. The 
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separate accrued interest figure reflects interest which has 
accrued since January 1, 1988 at the floor rate of 13% per 
annum (rather than the penalty rate of 18% per annum). The per 
diem rate of interest on the first Promissory Note is $166.55. 
25. Defendants have also failed to make payments 
according to the requirements of the second Promissory Note 
dated March 31, 1986 (Exhibit "E" to Complaint C86-6725), and 
are in default thereunder. 
26. As of November 1, 1989, the amount due and owing 
on the second Promissory Note dated March 31, 1986 was 
$61,580.41, consisting of principal in the amount of $45,684.06 
together with accrued interest of $15,896.75. 
27. The principal amount due on the second Promissory 
Note includes the original loan amount and costs together with 
accrued interest to and including December 31, 1987. 
Thereafter, Interlake Thrift's records were computerized and a 
separate interest balance was calcualted with respect to said 
Note. The separate accrued interest figure reflects interest 
which has accrued since January 1, 1988 at the floor rate of 
13% per annum (rather than the penalty rate of 18% per annum). 
The per diem rate on the second Promissory Note is $16.27. 
28. Interlake retained the law firm of Van Cott, 
Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy ("Van Cott1') to prosecute the 
present actions. The services rendered or to be rendered by 
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Van Cott in behalf of plaintiff have been reasonably necessary 
in the exercise of diligence and care to the collection of the 
subject Promissory Notes, the protection and foreclosure of the 
subject Trust Deeds and matters otherwise related to these 
actions. 
DATED this 6r day of November, 1989, 
V u u,) [\ A^c" Chris Davis 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me 
this / -" day of November, 1989, by Chris Davis. 
&£<& 3T.TL.LA BA^.'O* 
/> 
' Wws£v& 5al!L>-i Cry 'J-: ; -'-' •••• ; X ^ - ^ O ^ - ^ / <-
"&S&A $ "v^—' >-;:-., : NOTARY PUBLIC / 
, W | £ b > ^ ; - : / ; x : - • Residing at: A 
JL*' 
dv^,&A. Liu TTT7 
I \i4i C*« •-— * 
My Commission Expires: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing Affidavit of Chris Davis to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, this [fl[v\ day of November, 1989, to 
the following: 
John B. Swank 
114 Flag Way 
Pasa Robles, California 93447 
Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Allyn and Company 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
7004A 
102589 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba Interlake Thrift -
Mortgage Division, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS 
KENT ALLYN dba J & D 
PROPERTIES, a California 
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT 
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN 
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND 
COMPANY, a California 
Partnership, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-6726 
Honorable John A. Rokich 
Plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, dba Interlake 
Thrift - Mortgage Division ("Interlake") submits the following 
points and authorities in support of its motions for summary 
judgment and default judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an action to foreclose two trust deeds 
encumbering real property situated at approximately 315 East 
300 South in Salt Lake City, Salt County, State of Utah. 
Plaintiff Interlake, through its court appointed liquidator/ 
receiver, Grant Thornton, is the beneficiary and assignee of 
the trust deeds encumbering the above-described property. 
Defendants are trustors of the subject trust deed property 
and/or have assigned security to plaintiff to cover the trust 
deed obligations. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Grant Thornton is the court appointed liquidator/ 
receiver of plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, dba Interlake 
Thrift - Mortgage Division ("Interlake"), a Utah corporation 
whose principal place of business is in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(Aff. of C. Davis at IT 2. ) 
2. Defendant John B. Swank, whose default was entered 
in this case by the Clerk of this Court on February 23, 1989, 
is a resident of the State of California. 
3. Defendants Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John 
Allyn are residents of the State of California. The Allyns 
engaged in business under the name Allyn and Company, a 
California partnership. (Answer at U 3.) 
4. John B. Swank and Douglas Kent Allyn also did 
business under the name J & D Properties, a California 
partnership. (Swank Default; Answer at 11 3.) 
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Interlake Thrift Loan 
5. On October 31, 1985, defendants Douglas Kent Allyn 
and John B. Swank executed that certain Promissory Note in the 
principal amount of Two Hundred and Two Thousand Four Hundred 
Fifty and No/100 Dollars ($202,450.00) payable to USA Financial 
Corporation, dba Interlake Thrift - Mortgage Division, a true 
and correct copy of which is attached to the Complaint as 
Exhibit "A." (Amended Response to Requests for Admission, 
Request Nos. 1 and 2.) 
6. As security for this Promissory Note, Douglas 
Allyn and John Swank also executed that certain Deed of Trust 
with Assignment of Rents dated October 31, 1985, encumbering 
certain real property situated at approximately 315 East 300 
South, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, as more 
particularly described therein. A true and correct copy of 
this Deed of Trust is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "B," 
and was recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on 
March 7, 1986 as Entry No. 4211971 at Book 5742, Page 2990. 
(Amended Response to Request for Admissions, Request Nos. 6 and 
7.) 
7. As further security for the Promissory Note, 
defendant Douglas Allyn executed an Assignment dated October 
31, 1985 in behalf of Allyn and Company, a California 
Partnership, assigning to USA Financial Corporation, all of 
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Allyn and Company's right, title and interest in and to PRB, 
Ltd., a California limited partnership, which consists of an 
undivided 16.3636 percentage interest in said limited 
partnership. A true and correct copy of this Assignment, which 
was recorded in the official records of Los Angeles County, 
California on March 11, 1986, is attached to the Complaint as 
Exhibit "C." (Amended Response to Request for Admissions, 
Request Nos. 10 and 11.) 
8. In January, 1986, Douglas Allyn and John Swank 
executed a Renewal Agreement, a true and correct copy of which 
is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "D." (Amended Response 
to Request for Admissions, Request Nos. 14 and 15.) 
9. Defendants Swank and Douglas Allyn have failed to 
make payments according to the requirements of the Promissory 
Note (Exhibit MA") and are in default thereunder. (Amended 
Response to Request for Admissions, Request No. 22; Aff. of C. 
Davis at HIT 5-8. ) 
10. As of November 1, 1989, the total amount due and 
owing under the Promissory Note was Three Hundred Seventy-One 
Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy One and 30/100 Dollars 
($371,871.30), which includes a principal balance of 
$251,349.69 and accrued interest of $120,521.61. (Aff. of C. 
Davis at IT 9 . ) 
11. The principal balance due includes the original 
loan amount together with accrued interest from the date of the 
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note to and including December 31, 1987. The accrued interest 
figure is calculated from January 1, 1988 at the rate of 18% 
per annum. The per diem charge on this Promissory Note is 
$123.96. (Aff. of C. Davis at 11 10.) 
Commerce Financial Loan 
12. On or about November 5, 1985, defendant John 
Swank executed a second Promissory Note in the principal amount 
of Four Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand Four Hundred Nineteen and 
64/100 Dollars ($455,419.64) payable to Commerce Financial. A 
true and correct copy of this second Promissory Note is 
attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "E." (Amended Response to 
Request for Admissions, Request No. 17; Swank Default; Aff. of 
C. Davis at 11 11. ) 
13. As security for this second Promissory Note, 
Swank executed a second Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents 
dated November 5, 1985 encumbering the same real property 
situated at approximately 315 East 300 South in Salt Lake City, 
Utah that was encumbered as security for Interlake Thrift's 
loan, and which is more particularly described therein. A true 
and correct copy of this second Deed of Trust is attached to 
the Complaint as Exhibit "F." This second Deed of Trust was 
recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on November 
6, 1985, as Entry No. 4160854 at Book 5707, Page 793. (Amended 
Response to Requests for Admissions, Request No. 21; Aff. of C. 
Davis at 11 12. ) 
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V 
14. Commerce Financial declared its Promissory Note 
to be in default and initiated foreclosure of the Trust Deed 
Property. On or about July 15, 1986, Commerce Financial 
assigned its interest in and to the above-described second 
Promissory Note and Deed of Trust to USA Financial Mortgage dba 
Interlake Thrift. A true and correct copy of this Assignment 
is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "G.,f (Aff. of C. Davis 
at 1 13. ) 
15. Swank has failed to make payments according to 
the requirements of this second Promissory Note (Exhibit "E") 
and is in default thereunder. (Swank default; Aff. of C. Davis 
at f 15.) 
16. As of November 1, 1989, the total amount due on 
the second Promissory Note was Eight Hundred Forty-Three 
,<Sl Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-Five and 10/100 Dollars 
($843,535.10), which includes a principal balance of 
$536,421.74 and interest of $307,113.36. (Aff. of C. Davis at 
11 16. ) 
17. The principal balance due on the Commerce 
Financial Loan includes the original loan amount together with 
accrued interest, costs and attorneys' fees incurred by 
Commerce Financials in order to collect on this loan to July 
15, 1986, at which point the loan was signed to Interlake for a 
payment of $513,033.78 representing the then principal balance 
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of the loan, including the above stated amounts. This 
principal amount also includes subsequent charges against the 
subject property representing payment of delinquent taxes by 
Interlake. The accrued interest figure is calculated from July 
15, 1986 at the rate of 18% per annum. The per diem charge on 
this Promissory Note is $264.54. (Aff. of C. Davis at H 17.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF If> ENTITLED TO A DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANT JOHN SWANK. 
Defendant John Swank's default was taken pursuant to 
Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 
55(b), Interlake is entitled to a default judgment against 
Swank adjudging the total amount due by him to Interlake on the 
first and second Promissory Notes above in the total amount of 
$1,215,406.40, together with costs, attorneys' fees and 
interest which continues to accrue pursuant to the Promissory 
Notes at the rate of 18% per annum. Interlake is further 
entitled to an order directing the sale of the mortgaged 
property to satisfy said amount and all accured and accruing 
costs and interest, and directing the sheriff to proceed to 
sell the same according to the provisions of law relating to 
sales on execution, and also to a special execution order of 
sale to be issued for that purpose pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-37-1 et: seq. 
In the event the proceeds from the sale of the trust 
deed property are insufficient, and a balance still remains 
due, a judgment must also be docketed by the Clerk in the 
amount of the deficiency and execution issued for such balance 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-37-2. 
II. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS DOUGLAS ALLYN, RICHARD ALLYN, AND ALLYN AND 
COMPANY. 
Plaintiff is also entitled pursuant to Rule 56(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to a judgment against 
defendants Douglas Allyn, Richard Allyn, and Allyn and Company 
on the first Promissory Note dated October 31, 1985. There are 
no disputed issues of fact with respect to the execution of 
said Note or the security agreements encumbering the Trust Deed 
property and the partnership interest of Allyn and Company in 
PRB, Ltd. Further, there is no dispute regarding defendants' 
default under the first Promissory Note, or with respect to the 
present amount of the obligations secured by the Trust Deed 
property. Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted to 
plaintiff because it is clear from these undisputed facts that 
the defendants cannot prevail as a matter of law and that 
plaintiff is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against the Allyns 
and Allyn and Company adjudging the amount due under the first 
Promissory Note in the amount of $371,871.30, together with 
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costs, attorneys' fees and accrued interest. Plaintiff is also 
entitled to an order directing the sale of the trust deed 
property to satisfy said amount, and directing the sheriff to 
proceed to sell the same according to the provisions of law 
relating to sales on execution, and to a special execution 
order of sale for that purpose pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-37-1. In the event the proceeds from the sale are 
insufficient to satisfy this judgment, and a balance still 
remains due, a deficiency judgment must thereafter be docketed 
by the Clerk and execution may then issue for such balance 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-37-2. 
In addition, by reason of defendants' default, 
plaintiff is entitled to an order foreclosing the interest of 
Allyn and Company in PRB, Ltd., a California limited 
partnership, consisting of an undivided 16.3636 percent 
interest. There is no dispute that this limited partnership 
interest was assigned to plaintiff as security for defendant's 
obligations pursuant to the first Promissory Note. A judgment 
should be entered decreeing that the assignment of the limited 
partnership interest was an effective assignment that created a 
good and sufficient lien upon Allyn and Company's interest in 
said limited partnership in favor of Interlake. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-9-102(2), -106, and -201(37). Accordingly, the 
judgment herein must provide for the foreclosure of the 
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above-described security interest in PRB, Ltd. and order the 
sale of the interest by the sheriff pursuant to Rule 69(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
III. PLAINTIFFS' LIENS AGAINST THE TRUST DEED PROPERTY ARE 
SENIOR AND SUPERIOR TO ANY OTHER LIENS. 
Finally, there are no persons holding a conveyance 
from or under the mortgagor of the subject property, or having 
a lien thereon, which conveyance or lien appeared of record at 
the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office at the time this action 
was commenced and, therefore, plaintiff is also entitled to an 
order adjudging its security interest in the subject property 
to be superior and senior to the interest of any party holding 
a conveyance of the mortgaged property, or having a lien 
thereon, and any such party's interest should be foreclosed and 
found to be inferior to the plaintiff's interest. 
IV. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES 
AND COSTS. 
The Promissory Note dated October 31, 1985 by and 
between Interlake Thrift and defendants Douglas Kent Allyn and 
John B. Swank provides for the payment of costs and attorneys' 
fees upon default by the makers. Likewise, the Deed of Trust 
of even date provides for the payment of costs and attorneys' 
fees upon a default in the obligations set forth therein. 
Similarly, the Commerce Financial Promissory Note 
dated November 5, 1985 provides that attorneys' fees and costs 
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are to be paid in the event of a default thereunder. The Deed 
of Trust of even date also provides for the payment of 
attorneys' fees and costs upon default. This Promissory Note 
and Trust Deed were later assigned to Interlake, including 
Interlake's right to recover the attorneys' fees incurred by 
Commerce Financial and Interlake as a result of any default 
thereunder. 
Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to an award of its 
attorneys' fees which are set forth in greater detail in the 
accompanying Affidavit of John A. Anderson. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff is entitled to a 
default judgment against John Swank. Plaintiff is also 
entitled to a summary judgment against defendants Douglas 
Allyn, Richard Allyn, and Allyn and Company. Plaintiff is 
further entitled to a judgment declaring the seniority and 
superiority of its liens against the Trust Deed property. 
DATED this jj^L-day of AJpJ^A^^ 1989. 
VAN COTT, BAGH&JEtf/j CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John A r 4 \ r r a e r s o n v -
At t /o rneys f o r P l a i n t i f f 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, this jfU day of /Ud&^&S 
1989, to the following: 
John B. Swank 
114 Flag Way 
Pasa Robles, California 93447 
Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Allyn and Company 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 9 
7002A 
110389 
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JOHN BURTON ANDERSON #0092 
KEVIN V. OLSEN #4105 
Anderson & Dunn 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801) 944-0990 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
USA FINACIAL CORPORATION, ) 
dba Interlake Thrift - ) 
Mortgage Division, a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
) AMENDED RESPONSE TO 
Plaintiffs, ) REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
vs. ) 
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS KENT ) 
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES, ) Civil No. C86-6726 
a California Partnership; DOUGLAS ) 
KENT ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN ALLYN, ) Honorable John A. Rokich 
SR., dba ALLYN AND COMPANY, ) 
a California Partnership, ) 
Defendants. ) 
Come now, the Defendants, Douglas Kent Allyn, 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. and Allyn and Company, a California 
Partnership and pursuant to Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure answer Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for 
Admissions as follows: 
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that Exhibit "A" to the Com-
plaint was executed on or about October 31, 1985 by Douglas 
Kent Allyn. 
-2-
ANSWER: Admit to the execution of the Promissory 
Note, copy of which is attached as Exhibit A to Complaint with 
Civil No- C86-6726. 
REQUEST HO. 2: Admit that Exhibit "A" to the Com-
plaint was executed on or about October 31, 1985 by John 3. 
Swank. 
ANSWER: Defendant Douglas Kent Allyn was present 
when many of the documents were signed by John B. Swank and to 
the best of his recollection admits that John B. Swank executed 
this document. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that Swank and Douglas Kent 
Allyn were partners in J & D Properties, a California partner-
ship. 
ANSWER: Deny. J & D Properties, Inc. was supposed 
to be a corporation whose corporate status with the State of 
Utah was verified by Jeff Perkins. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn executed 
Exhibit "A" to the Complaint in behalf of himself and as a 
partner in J & D Properties. 
ANSWER: Deny. Douglas Kent Allyn signed as an 
officer of J & D Properties, Inc. 
REQUEST NO. 5: Admit that John B. Swank executed 
Exhibit "A" to the Complaint in behalf of himself and as a 
partner in J & D Properties. 
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ANSWER: Deny, in as much as these Defendants under-
stood Swank to be signing as an officer of J & D Properties, a 
corporation. 
REQUEST NO. 6: Admit that Defendant Douglas Kent 
Allyn executed Exhibit "B" to the Complaint on or about October 
31, 1985. 
ANSWER: Admits to the execution of the trust deed, 
a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B to Complaint with 
Civil No. C86-6726. 
REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that Defendant John B. Swank 
executed Exhibit "B" to the Complaint on or about October 31, 
1985. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 2 above. 
REQUEST NO. 8: Admit that Defendant Kent Allyn 
executed Exhibit "B" to the Complaint in behalf of himself and 
as a partner in J & D Properties. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 4 above. 
REQUEST NO. 9: Admit that Defendant John B. Swank 
executed Exhibit "B" to the Complaint in behalf of himself and 
as a partner in J & D Properties. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 5 above. 
REQUEST NO. 10: Admit that Defendant Douglas Kent 
Allyn executed Exhibit "C" to the Complaint on or about October 
31, 1985. 
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ANSWERs Admit to the execution of the Assignment, a 
copy of which is attached as Exhibit C to the Complaint with 
Civil No. C86-6726. 
REQUEST NO. 11: Admit that Defendant Richard John 
Allyn executed Exhibit "C" to the Complaint on or about October 
31, 1985. 
ANSWER: Deny. This document was signed by Douglas 
Kent Allyn for Allyn & Company. 
REQUEST NO. 12: Admit that on or about October 31, 
1985 Defendants Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John Allyn, 
Sr.f were partners in Allyn and Company, a California partner-
ship. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 13: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn 
executed Exhibit C to the Complaint in behalf of himself and 
Richard John Allyn, Sr., as partners in Allyn and Company, a 
California partnership. 
ANSWER: Admit that Douglas Kent Allyn executed in 
behalf of the partnership. There was no intent to sign on 
behalf of Richard John Allyn, Sr. personally. 
REQUEST NO. 14: Admit that Defendant Douglas Kent 
Allyn executed Exhibit "D" to the Complaint on or about January 
15, 1986. 
ANSWER: Admit to execution of Renewal Agreement as 
of the date set forth thereon, a copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit D. to the Complaint with Civil Mo. C86-6726. 
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REQUEST NO. 15: Admit that Defendant Jonh B. Swank 
executed Exhibit "D" to the Complaint on or about January 15, 
1986. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 2 above. 
REQUEST NO. 16: Admit that Defendant Douglas Kenc 
Allyn executed Exhibit ME" to the Complaint on or about November 
5, 1985. 
ANSWER: Deny. The copy appears to have Swank's 
signature. 
REQUEST NO. 17: Admit that Defendant John B. Swank 
executed Exhibit "E" to the Complaint on or about November 5, 
1985. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 2 above. 
REQUEST NO. 18: Admit that Swank and Douglas Kent 
Allyn failed to make payments on Exhibit "E" to the Complaint, 
resulting in foreclosure proceedings by Commerce Finacial. 
ANSWER: Deny as to Doug Kent Allyn who was not 
obligated under Exhibit E. 
REQUEST NO. 19: Admit that on July 15, 1986, Plain-
tiff purchased an assignment of Commerce Financial's interest 
in the real property described in Exhibit "F" to the Complaint, 
ANSWER: Defendants have no way of knowing this and 
therefore deny. Plaintiff should have this information. 
REQUEST NO. 20: Admit that Defendant Douglas Kent 
Allyn executed Exhibit "F" to the Complaint on or about 
November 6, 1985. 
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ANSWER: Deny, This appears to bear Swank's signa-
ture. 
REQUEST NO. 21: Admit that Defendant John B. Swank 
executed Exhibit "F" to the Complaint on or about November 6, 
1985. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 2 above* 
REQUEST NO. 22: Admit that Swank and Douglas Kent 
Allyn failed to make payments according to the requirements of 
Exhibit "A" to the Complaint. 
ANSWER: Admit 
REQUEST NO. 23: Admit that Swank and Douglas Kent 
Allyn failed to make payments according to the requirements of 
Exhibit "E" to the Complaint. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 18 above. 
DATED this „-V;- day of June, 1988. 
Atxorn^Y for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND"DELIVERY 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Amended Response to Requests for 
Admissions were h«u*4-*4a4rivered on the . * . " day of June, 1988, 
to John A. Anderson, VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY at 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba Interlake Thrift -
Mortgage Division, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS 
KENT ALLYN dba J & D 
PROPERTIES, a California 
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT 
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN 
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND 
COMPANY, a California 
Partnership, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
John A. Anderson, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am a resident of the State of Utah, over the age 
of 18, and otherwise competent to make this affidavit. Except 
those matters stated on information and belief, which I believe 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JOHN A. ANDERSON 
Civil No. C86-6726 
Honorable John A. Rokich 
to be true, the matters set forth below are based on my 
personal knowledge, and if called as a witness, I could and 
would competently testify thereto. 
2. I am a shareholder in the law firm of Van Cott, 
Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy ("Van Cott") in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar and 
I am qualified to practice before all courts of the State of 
Utah. 
3. Van Cott has been retained by Grant Thornton, the 
court appointed receiver/liquidator of plaintiff USA Financial 
Corporation dba Interlake Thrift - Mortgage Division 
("Interlake") to prosecute the present action. I am the 
attorney now primarily responsible for the prosecution of said 
action. In such capacity, I am familiar with the costs which 
have been advanced and the attorneys' fees charged and to be 
charged in collecting the amounts due under the subject 
Promissory Notes and in foreclosing the subject Trust Deeds by 
Van Cott. 
4. The plaintiff's request for attorneys* fees is 
predicated on the specific provisions of the Promissory Note 
dated October 31, 1985 and the accompanying Deed of Trust with 
Assignment of Rents of eve : date, both of which provide for the 
payment of all costs, a reasonable attorneys' fee and expenses 
incurred by Interlake Thrift upon default. This request is 
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also based on the Promissory Note dated November 5, 1985 by and 
between John Swank and Commerce Financial, as well as the 
accompanying Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents of even 
date, both of which provide for the payment of all costs and 
expenses incurred in the collection of the Note, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of any judicial action 
brought as a result of a default therein. The Commerce 
Financial Note and Trust Deed were assigned to plaintiff, as a 
result of which plaintiff is entitled to recover all attorneys' 
fees and costs expended both by Commerce Financial and 
Interlake as a result of the maker's default thereunder. 
5. The attorneys' fees which plaintiff has incurred 
for services through November 1, 1989 in collecting the amounts 
due under the subject Promissory Notes and foreclosing the 
subject Trust Deeds is $5,948.75, based on 61.50 hours of work 
by the following attorneys: 
Patricia Olsen 9.00 hours at $80.00 per hour 
Patricia Olsen 7.00 hours at $85.00 per hour 
Thomas T. Billings 1.25 hours at $130.00 per hour 
Thomas T. Billings 1.50 hours at $140.00 per hour 
Marilyn M. Henriksen 7.50 hours at $95.00 per hour 
John A. Anderson 15.25 hours at $95.00 per hour 
John A. Anderson 20.00 hours at $105.00 per hour 
These hourly rates are below the normal hourly rate charged by 
attorneys at Van Cott and are reasonable fees for comparable 
legal services. 
6. These services represent time spent in 
investigation of facts, legal research, drafting of the 
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Complaint, discovery matters, preparation of the motion for 
summary judgment and related pleadings, interoffice 
conferences, conferences with Grant Thornton and its 
representatives, preparation of correspondence and telephone 
conferences with plaintiff, third parties and opposing counsel, 
and protection of the Trust Deed Property. 
7. Assuming that no services are required beyond 
final preparation of the motion for summary judgment after 
November 1, 1989, responding to defendants' opposition to said 
motion, if any, appearing and arguing the motion, preparing the 
appropriate order and documents relating to the sale of 
collateral and attending the sheriff's sale, the additional 
attorneys' fees to be charged to plaintiff will be 
approximately $2,000.00. 
8. All of said services rendered or to be rendered by 
Van Cott in behalf of plaintiff have been reasonably necessary 
in the exercise of diligence and care to the collection of the 
subject Promissory Notes, the protection and foreclosure of the 
subject Trust Deeds and matters otherwise germane to this 
action. 
DATED this fc^L^day of November, V989. 
- < • -
ss . 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me 
this in-iVx day of November, 1989, by John A. Anderson. 
Y PUBLIC ^~~ C±~t-
My Commission Expires 
"ifOfARY 
Residing at: ftU-U-LM , 1/Jjt>\ 
m-v 
.^ s& 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing Affidavit of John A. Anderson to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, this fe/, day of f J ^ ^ M ^ 
1989, to the following: 
John B. Swank 
114 Flag Way 
Pasa Robles, California 93447 
Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Allyn and Company 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 9 
7007A 
110389 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba Interlake Thrift -
Mortgage Division, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS 
KENT ALLYN dba J & D 
PROPERTIES, a California 
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT 
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN 
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND 
COMPANY, a California 
Partnership, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Chris Davis, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am a resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, over the age of 18, and otherwise competent to make this 
affidavit. Except those matters stated on information and 
belief, which I believe to be true, the matters set forth below 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
CHRIS DAVIS 
Civil No. C86-6726 
Honorable John A. Rokich 
are based on my personal knowledge, and if called as a witness, 
I could and would competently testify thereto. 
2. I was employed by Interlake Thrift as the Office 
Manager of the Mortgage Division from approximately January, 
1983 to June, 1985. In that capacity, I familiarized myself 
with the business records of Interlake Thrift, including the 
records maintained by Interlake Thrift in the regular and 
ordinary course of its business relating to loan transactions 
such as those at issue in the present lawsuit. 
3. On July 1, 1987, Grant Thornton was appointed as 
the receiver/liquidator of plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, 
dba Interlake Thrift - Mortgage Division. 
4. I have been employed as Operations Manager of 
Interlake Thrift from August, 1987 to the present. In that 
capacity, I have access to and am familiar with the business 
records of Interlake Thrift which it has maintained in the 
regular and ordinary course of its business to reflect loan 
transactions such as those at issue in the present lawsuit. My 
job responsibilities include, among other things, supervision 
and collection of Interlake Thrift's delinquent loan accounts. 
Interlake Thrift Loan 
5. I have reviewed and am personally familiar with 
Interlake Thrift's documents concerning Loan No. L200179, which 
relates to that certain Promissory Note dated October 31, 1985 
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in the principal amount of Two Hundred Two Thousand Four 
Hundred Fifty and No/100 Dollars ($202,450.00) payable to USA 
Financial Mortgage Corp. dba Interlake Thrift, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit 
MA.,f The records of Interlake Thrift reflect that this loan 
amount was disbursed to or the benefit of the makers, Douglas 
Allyn and John Swank, on or about October 31, 1985. 
6. I have also reviewed and am personally familiar 
with that certain Deed of Trust dated October 31, 1985 by and 
between J & D Properties, Inc., Douglas Allyn and John Swank. 
This Deed of Trust encumbers certain real property situated at 
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah at 
approximately 315 East 300 South as more particularly described 
therein. 
7. I have also reviewed and am personally familiar 
with that certain Assignment dated October 31, 1985 in behalf 
of Allyn and Company, a California general partnership, 
assigning to USA Financial Corporation, all of Allyn and 
Company's right, title and interest in and to PRB, Ltd., a 
California limited partnership. A true and correct copy of 
this Assignment is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "C.M 
8. Defendants John Swank and Douglas Allyn have 
failed to make payments according to the requirements of the 
Promissory Note (Exhibit "A") and are default thereunder. This 
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default first occurred on April 30, 1986 when, pursuant to the 
Renewal Agreement (Exhibit MD M), said defendants failed to make 
the required payment of principal and accrued interest. 
9. As of November 1, 1989, the total amount due and 
owing under the Promissory Note was $371,871.30, which includes 
the principal balance of $251,349.69 and accrued interest of 
$120,521.67. 
10. The principal balance due includes the original 
loan amount and costs together with accrued interest from the 
date of the Promissory Note to and including December 31, 
1987. Thereafter, Interlake Thrift1s records were computerized 
and a separate interest balance was calculated with respect to 
said Note. The separate accrued interest figure reflects 
interest which has accrued since January 1, 1988 at the rate of 
18% per annum, the penalty rate set forth in the Promissory 
Note. The per diem charge on this Promissory Note is $123.96. 
Commerce Financial Loan 
11. I have reviewed and am personally familiar with 
Interlake Thrift's records concerning that certain loan 
transaction by and between Commerce Financial and John Swank 
that is also the subject of this lawsuit. On or about November 
5, 1985, defendant John Swank executed a second Promissory Note 
in the principal amount of Four Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand 
Four Hundred Nineteen and 64/100 Dollars ($455,419.64) payable 
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to Commerce Financial. A true and correct copy of this second 
Promissory Note is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "E." 
12. As security for the second Promissory Note, Swank 
executed a Deed of Trust dated November 5, 1985, encumbering 
the same real property as was encumbered as security for 
Interlake Thrift's Loan No. L200179. A true and correct copy 
of this second Trust Deed is attached to the Complaint as 
Exhibit "F." 
13. Commerce Financial later declared this second 
Promissory Note to be in default and initiated foreclosure of 
the subject Trust Deed Property. As a result, on or about July 
15, 1986, Interlake paid $513,033.78 to purchase an assignment 
of Commerce Financial's interest in and to the above-described 
second Promissory Note and Deed of Trust. A true and correct 
copy of this Assignment is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit 
"G." 
14. On July 15, 1986, Interlake Thrift began to carry 
this Commerce Financial loan in the principal amount of 
$513,033.78 on its records. 
15. Swank has failed to make payments according to 
the requirements of the second Promissory Note (Exhibit MEM) 
and is in default thereunder. 
16. As of November 1, 1989, the total amount due on 
the second Promissory Note was $843,535.10, which includes the 
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principal balance of $536,421.74 and accrued interest of 
$307,113.36. 
17. The principal amount due includes the amount 
transferred to Interlake Thrift as of July 15, 1986 with 
accrued interest through December 31, 1987. Thereafter, 
Interlake Thrift's records were computerized and a separate 
interest balance was calculated with respect to said Note. The 
separate accrued interest figure reflects interest which has 
accrued since January 1, 1988 at the penalty rate of 18% 
specified in the Promissory Note. The per diem charge on this 
loan is $264.54. 
18. Interlake retained the law firm of Van Cott, 
Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy (MVan Cott") to prosecute the 
present action. The services rendered or to be rendered by Van 
Cott in behalf of plaintiff have been reasonably necessary in 
the exercise of diligence and care to the collection of the 
subject Promissory Notes, the protection and foreclosure of the 
subject Trust Deeds and matters otherwise related to this 
action. 
i-SI-
DATED this J day of November, 1989. 
Cnris Davis 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me 
this / ---^  day of November.,^  1989, by Chris Davis 
-£XCtt> c^... 
NOTARY PUBLIC _ .
 : 
Residing at: MUA -X./U.. & C «. (,/ 
My Commission Expires: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing Affidavit of Chris Davis to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, this \ ^ \ day of November, 1989, to 
the following: 
John B. Swank 
114 Flag Way 
Pasa Robles, California 93447 
Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Allyn and Company 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, Calirfo^nia 92020 
7004A 
102589 
fcihflfc ^,7rv 
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JOHN BURTON ANDERSON #0092 
Anderson & Dunn 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801) 944-0990 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, ) 
dba Interlake Thrift - ) 
Mortgage Division, a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN B. ANDERSON 
VS. ) 
) Civil No. C86-6724 
JOHN B. SWANK, DOUGLAS KENT ) 
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES, ) 
a California Partnership; ) 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD) 
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND) 
COMPANY, a California ) 
Partnership, ) 
Defendants. ) 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION ) 
dba Interlake Thrift - ) 
Mortgage Division, a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) Civil No. C86-6725 
vs. ) 
JOHN B. SWANK an individual, ) 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD) 
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND) 
COMPANY, a Partnership; all ) 
dba Parkway Village, a Joint ) 
Venture, ) 
Defendants. ) 
EXHIBIT B 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant, John B. Anderson, being first duly sworn 
upon his oath deposes and states as follows: 
1. That he is a citizen of the United State oc 
America and a resident of the State of Utah over the age of 21 
years, 
2. That he is an attorney at law licensed to prac-
tice in the State of Utah. 
3. That on' or about June 22, 19PQ, the undersiqned 
filed a Notice of Withdrawal in connection with his represen-
tation of Defendants, Douglas Kent Allyn and Pichard John 
Allyn, Sr., in the above-entitled matter. 
4. That such withdrawal is based uoon an under-
standing with said Defendants, that the undersigned should 
represent them any further in the above-entitled matter. 
5. That on or about November 13, 1989, the under-
signed received a telephone request from Douglas Allyn, one of 
the above named Defendants who resides in El Caion, California, 
that the undersigned again undertake representation of said 
Defendants in connection with the above-entitled matter based 
upon certain Motions that had been filed against Defendants in 
this action. 
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6. That said Defendants subseauently mailed a coov 
of various documents to the undersigned pertaining to said 
Motions and the undersigned has consented to further represent 
said Defendants in the above-entitled matter* 
7. In connection therewith, the undersigned has 
filed with the Court; concurrent herewith, an Entry of Appear-
ance on behalf of said Defendants. 
8. That the undersigned understands on information 
and belief from discussing the matter with said Defendants 
that the Defendants do not understand the significance of said 
Motions on the Defendants in the event said Defendants did not 
file a response thereto and accordingly, would suffer irreper-
able harm in the event they are not represented in the present 
proceeding. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAIETH NOT this /^W?ay of November, 
1989. 
Jojfn^urxon Anderson / 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN «r~£efore me this / ^ ^ d a v of 
November, 1989. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Affidavit on this ^/fl^'dav of November, 
1989, postage prepaid to John A. Anderson, VAN COTT, BAGLFY, 
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY, 50 South Main Street, Suite 1600, P.O. 
Box 45340, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145. 
/! I: ^ N 
!* 1 . \ 
u Ji . ^ , ^ / C Jo-trkteru 
JOHN BURTON ANDERSON #00 92 
Anderson & Dunn 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801) 944-0990 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, ) 
dba Interlake Thrift - ) 
Mortgage Division, a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) EX PARTE MOTION 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. C86-6724 
JOHN B. SWANK, DOUGLAS KENT ) 
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES, ) 
a California Partnership; ) 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD) 
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND) 
COMPANY, a California ) 
Partnership, ) 
Defendants. ) 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION ) 
dba Interlake Thrift - ) 
Mortgage Division, a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) Civil No. C86-6725 
vs. ) 
JOHN B. SWANK an individual, ) 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD) 
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND) 
COMPANY, a Partnership; all ) 
dba Parkway Village, a Joint ) 
Venture, ) 
Defendants. 
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The Defendants, Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John 
Allynf Sr., by and through their leqal counsel, John Burton 
Anderson, respectfully represent to and moves the Court as 
follows: 
1. The entry of appearance of John Burton Anderson 
as legal counsel for said Defendants is filed with the Court 
concurrent with this Motion. 
2. Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter has filed 
its "Motions for Summary Judgment and Default Judgment" in the 
above-entitled matter, which Motions are presently before the 
Court. 
3. That at the time of filinq said Motions bv 
Plaintiff, said Defendants were not represented by leaal 
counsel in this matter, notwithstanding that they had pre-
viously been served with "Notice to Appoint Counsel or Appear 
in Person". 
4. That said Defendants are residents of the State 
of California and are not acquainted with the laws of the 
State of Utah nor do they understand the siqnificance of the 
failure to appoint legal counsel or appear in person with 
respect to matters involved in the above-entitled action; that 
such failure to appoint counsel or appear in person is due to 
understandable neglect on the part of said Defendants and that 
had said Defendants understood the significance of such neglect 
or failure to appoint or appear they would have responded in a 
timely manner. 
-3-
5. That by reason of the filing of such Motions for 
Summary Judgment and Default Judgment by Plaintiffs, said 
Defendants would suffer irreparable harm due to such under-
standable neglect. 
ACCORDINGLY, SAID DEFENDANTS HEREBY MOVE THE COURT1 
under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for an 
order as follows: 
1. That consideration of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Default Judgment and any decision thereon 
by the above-entitled Court be continued for a period of 
thirty (30) days from the date of such Order. 
2. That John B. Anderson as counsel for said Defen-
dants be permitted to file appropriate resoonses on behalr of 
said Defendants under the Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. 
This Motion is based upon the matter set forth above 
and upon the Affidavit of John B. Anderson as legal counsel 
for said Defendants which Affidavit is attached hereto. 
DATED this/^^iay of November, 19R9. 
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CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Ex Parte Motion on this /Jj day of 
November, 1989, postage prepaid to John A. Anderson, VAN COTT, 
BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY, 50 South Main Street, Suite 1600, 
P.O. Box 45340, Salt Lake City, Utah 8414S. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba Interlake Thrift -
Mortgage Division, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS 
KENT ALLYN dba J & D 
PROPERTIES, a California 
Partnership: DOUGLAS KENT 
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN 
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND 
COMPANY, a California 
Partnership, 
Defendants. 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba Interlake Thrift -
Mortgage Division, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN B. SWANK an individual, 
DOUGLAS KENT.ALLYN. and 
RICHARD JOHN ALLYN, SR., 
dba ALLYN AND COMPANY, a 
Partnership; all dba Parkway 
Village, a Joint Venture, 
Defendants. 
REQUEST FOR RULING 
AND OBJECTION TO EX PARTE 
MOTION 
Civil No. C86-6724 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Civil No. C86-6725 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
EXHIBIT C 
Plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, dba Interlake 
Thrift - Mortgage Division (MInterlakeM) hereby moves pursuant 
to Rule 4-501(8) for an order granting its motions for summary 
judgment and default judgment in the above-captioned matter. 
Plaintiff's motions for summary judgment and default judgment 
were served on defendant John B. Swank at his last known 
address in Pasa Robles, California by mail on November 6, 
1989. These pleadings were returned to Van Cott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy on or about November 12, 1989 by the United 
States Post Office with a notification that Mr. Swank no longer 
resides at his last known address and has left no'forwarding 
address. Swank, however, is already in default and service of 
these pleadings is unnecessary for plaintiff to obtain a 
default judgment against him. Utah R. Civ. P. 55(a)(2) 
(1989), Accordingly, plaintiff hereby requests that a default 
judgment be entered against Swank in accordance with the prayer 
for relief set forth in plaintiff's complaint and in its motion 
for entry of default judgment. 
Likewise, the motion for summary judgment was served 
on defendants Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John Allyn on 
November 6, 1989. The Allyns have not filed counteraffidavits 
or a memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment against them. Instead, on November 20, 1989, an 
appearance was entered by John Burton Anderson as counsel for 
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said defendants, and an ex parte motion was filed requesting 
that the Allyns be given additional time in which to respond to 
the motions for summary judgment. 
Interlake Thrift objects to Mr. Anderson's appearance 
as counsel and, further, objects to the ex parte motion to 
extend the time within which said defendants may respond to the 
motion for summary judgment. On or about June 22, 1989, Mr. 
Anderson filed his Notice of Withdrawal in connection with his 
representation of the Allyns. Immediately thereafter, on June 
29, 1989, plaintiff filed and served on the Allyns a notice to 
appear in person or to appoint counsel. The Allyns did nothing 
in response to this Notice until such time as they were served 
with the present motions, when they allegedly contacted their 
former counsel, John Burton Anderson, for the purpose of again 
retaining his services despite his earlier withdrawal. 
Mr. Anderson has filed an ex parte motion in behalf 
of the Allyns stating, among other things, that said defendants 
are understandably ignorant of and neglectful of Utah's laws 
regarding appointment of counsel. This motion should be 
stricken as it is not supported by any competent affidavits 
from the Allyns themselves but only by unverified allegations 
from Mr. Anderson. Further, the notice sent to the Allyns, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," clearly and 
unequivocally states that the Allyns are to appear in person or 
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to appoint counsel in order to defend the present lawsuit. 
Having failed to make any effort to do so, the Allyns waited 
until after this motion was filed before taking any action in 
that regard. 
The present motion is a further effort by the Allyns 
to unnecessarily delay the entry of a judgment against them on 
the subject promissory notes and trust deeds. The Allyns did 
not cooperate with their counsel at the time he did represent 
them and continually delayed in filing answers to discovery 
requests. In fact, the Allyns* discovery responses which ar 
attached as an exhibit to the present motion were the result of 
plaintiff's counsel's threats to move to compel adequate 
responses to those discovery requests. 
Defendants have not asserted any meritorious defense 
to plaintiff's claims. Defendants admit execution and default 
under the subject promissory notes and trust deeds, but 
apparently deny personal liability for any deficiency resulting 
from the sale of the trust deed property. This defense has 
never been substantiated with any evidence from defendants 
relieving them from any personal liability under the promissory 
notes in the event the trust deed property did not satisfy the 
default in their obligations thereunder. None of the 
transaction documents evidencing the subject loans release 
defendants of such liability and this defense, as is true of 
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the present motion, is interposed solely for the purpose of 
delay and is not well founded in law or fact. 
Accordingly, the Allynsf ex parte motion should be 
denied and an order should enter granting plaintiff*s motion 
for summary judgment pursuant to which plaintiff's counsel will 
prepare an appropriate judgment. 
1989 
VAN COTT, BAGLByy/CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
i
DATED this ^ >day of /[Jd^J^J^
 % 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing Request for Ruling and Objection to 
Ex Parte Motion to be mailed, postage prepaid, this day 
of NiwJ^OS , 1989, to the following: 
John B. Swank 
114 Flag Way 
Pasa Robles, California 93447 
John Burton Anderson, Esq. 
ANDERSON & DUNN 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Allyn and Company 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn^ 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 9 
7099A 
113089 
-6-
JOHN BURTON ANDERSON #0092 
Anderson & Dunn 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34121 
Telephone: (301) 944-0990 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, ) 
dba Interlake Thrift - ) 
Mortgage Division, a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) AFFIDAVIT 0* 
) DOUGLAS KENT ALL^N 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. C36-S724 
JOHN B. SWANK, DOUGLAS KENT ) 
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES, ) 
a California Partnership; ) 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD) 
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND) 
COMPANY, a California ) 
Partnership, ) 
Defendants. ) 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION ) 
dba Interlake Thrift - ) 
Mortgage Division, a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) Civil No. CS6-6725 
vs. ) 
JOHN B. SWANK an individual, ) 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD) 
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND) 
COMPANY, a Partnership; all ) 
dba Parkway Village, a Joint ) 
Venture, ) 
Defendants. ) 
EXHIBIT D 
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY ) 
The Affiant, Kent Allyn, beiru? first duly sworn uoon 
oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That he is competent to testify as a witness and 
personally knows the facts stated herein are true. 
2. That in connection with the loan transactions 
between Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John Allyn, Sr., dba 
Allyn and Company and USA Financial Corporation dba Tnterlake 
Thrift, pertaining to certain property known as "The Parkwav 
Village" which was a part thereof, the following is true to 
the best of Affiant's understanding and knowledge: 
a. The Parkway Village property was purchased 
from one of Interlake Thrift's customers who had 
completed approximately 50% of the proiect while 
being funded 100% of a construction loan of 
Interlake Thrift pertaining thereto. 
b. Originally the purchase was to be in the 
name of a corporation of the Defendants or in 
the alternative in the name of John Swank, one 
of the above Defendant's herein. Although Swank 
was the main strength to the transaction, Jefc 
Perkins, an officer of Interlake Thrift, indi-
cated that Interlake Thri ft could not have the 
transaction in Swank's nar\e because the total 
amount would exceed Interlake1s legal limit. 
c. After conversations with Perkins and as a 
means of accounting, Interlake Thrift and Perkins 
assured Affiant and others that there would be 
no personal liability toward them as part of the 
transaction and the parties then consented to 
signing for part of the loan. 
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d. That Perkins represented that if the oroiect 
did not go forward, Interlace Thrift would look 
only to the property and not to the Defendant's 
individually for satisfaction. Accordingly, 
Affiant and Richari John Allyn signed the loan 
documents on that basis. 
e. John Swank did not sign on behalf of Allyn 
and Company, Affiant or Richard John Allyn. 
f. In addition to representations of no personal 
liability in connection with said loans, Affiant 
and Richard John Allyn relied upon said Perkins 
representations as to the value and feasibility 
to this project and that Interlake Thrift would 
subsequently subordinate its interest in the 
project. 
g. All monies advanced by Interlake Thrift were 
used in either this project or a second proiect 
associated with this project. 
h. Neither Affiant nor Richard John Allyn 
received any funds from Interlake Thrift as part 
of said loan transaction. 
3. That the above information has been recited an^ 
given under oath to Plaintiff's as part of the "Response to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories" dated July ?2, I9«a 
and signed by Affiant and Richard John Allyn, a copy of which 
was delivered to Plaintiff. 
4. .That the purpose or tnis Affidavit is to demon-
strate the existance of questions of fact with respect to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Dlaintiff in this matter. 
DATED this j ^ day of "ec^mber, 19R9. 
/ ^JS(U. 
D o u ^ l v s ? e n t A l l v n 
i v - ^ . " ^ r , ^ , ,"• '•''31 I>91 
SUBSCRIBED, SWORN TO AND ACKNOWLEDGED before me this 
/ v^day of December, 1989, 
/ 
/ 
/ • - -
/-
V 
/ / 
V / 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: Residing at: 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILIWG 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Douglas Kent Allvn on this 
l^j day of December, 1989, postage preoaid to 7ohn A. 
Anderson, VAN COTT, 8AGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY at 50 South 
Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145. 
&HASYl4ff*{<4y£l 
JOHN BURTON ANDERSON #0092 
Anderson & Dunn 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (301) 944-0990 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTYf STATE OP UTAF 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, ) 
dba Interlake Thrift - ) 
Mortgage Division, a Utah ) 
corporation, ) MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
) TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
Plaintiff, ) JUDGMENT 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 036-6^26 
JOHN B. SWANK, DOUGLAS KENT ) 
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES, a ) 
California Partnership; ) 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD) 
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND) 
COMPANY, a California ) 
Partnership, ) 
Defendants. ) 
The Defendants, Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard Jo'^ n 
Allyn, Sr., pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah ^ules of Civil 
Procedure and Rule 4.501 of the Rules oc Judicial Administration 
hereby submit their responsive Memorandum to Plaintiff1 .i 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts as set forth in Plaintiff* 
"Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Supoort of Plain-
tiff's Motions for Summary Judgment and Default Judgment" are 
essentially correct except for the statements to the effect 
that the Defendants were acting either personally or as a 
-11-
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Do you contend that there was 
a failure of consideration from the Plaintiff to Defendants in 
the subject transaction? If so, state the following: 
(a) All facts on which you base this conten-
tion; 
(b) All persons with knowledge of any facts 
that substantiate such contention, including a brief summary 
of each such person's knowledge; and 
(c) All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate to or substantiate such contention. 
ANSWER: Yes 
(a) See paragraph 2{a) above. 
(b) See paragraph Kb) above. 
(c) See paragraph 1(c) above. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 15: Do you contend that Defendants 
have a right of offset against Plaintiff which is at least 
equal to the amount prayer for by Plaintiff in Complaint? If 
so, state the following: 
(a) All facts on which you base this conten-
tion, including but not limited *-c the specific amount of 
Defendants' alleged offset and tho manner in which you calcu-
lated said amount; 
(b) All persons with Knowledge of any facts 
that substantiate such contention, including a brief summary 
of each such person's knowledge; :mi 
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(c) All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate to or substantiate such contention. 
ANSWER: Yes 
(a) See paragraph 2ia) above. 
(b) See paragraph Kb) above. 
(c) See paragraph 1(c) above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Do you contend that to grant 
relief requested by the Plaintiff in the Complaint would result 
in unjust enrichment at the expense of the Defendants? If so, 
state the following: 
(a) All facts on which you base this conten-
tion; 
(b) All persons with knowledge of any facts 
that substantiate such contention, including a brief summary 
of each such person's knowledge; and 
(c) All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate to or substantiate such contention. 
ANSWER: Yes 
(a) See paragraph 2(a) above. 
(b) See paragraph Kb) above. 
(c) See paragraph i;c) above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Do you contend that Plaintiff 
made fraudulent misrepresentations to Defendants or any of 
them? If so, state the following: 
- 1 3 -
(a) All facts on which you base this conten-
tion including specifically each alleged misrepresentat ionf. 
the date thereof, the person(s) who communicated each such 
misrepresentation as well as each person to whom it was commun-
icated, and the method of communication; 
(b) All persons with knowledge of any facts 
that substantiate such contention, including a brief summary 
of each such person's knowledge; and 
(c) All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate to or substantiate such contention. 
ANSWER: Yes 
(a) See paragraph 2(a) above. 
(b) See paragraph Kb) above. 
(c) See paragraph 1(c) above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Do you contend that Plaintiff 
failed to disclose material facts to Defendants, or any of 
them, which it had a duty to disclose? If so, state the 
following: 
(a) All facts on which you base this conten-
tion, including all facts on which you base a claim that 
Plaintiff owed a duty to disclose material facts to Defendants 
and all such omitted facts; 
(b) All persons with knowledge of any facts 
that substantiate such contention, including a brief summary 
of each such person*s knowledge; and 
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(c) All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate to or substantiate such contention. 
ANSWER: Yes 
(a) See paragraph 2(a) above. 
(b) See paragraph 1(b) above. 
(c) See paragraph 1(c) above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19: Do you contend that Plaintiff 
is estopped from asserting and/or recovering pursuant to any 
of claims set forth in Complaint? If so, state the following: 
(a) All facts which you base this contention; 
(b) All persons with knowledge of any facts 
that substantiate such contention, including a brief summary 
of each such person's knowledge; and 
(c) All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate to or substantiate such contention. 
ANSWER: Yes 
(a) See paragraph 2(a) above. 
(b) See paragraph Kb) above. 
(c) See paragraph 1(c) above. 
INTERROGATORY NO* 20: Identify each person who you 
expect to or may call as a witness at trial, and for each such 
person state the following: 
(a) The subject matter about which the witness 
is expected to testify; and 
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(b) The substance of the facts and opinions to 
which the witness is expected to testify, including the source 
of the witness' knowledge concerning such facts and/or opinions, 
ANSWER: A list of witnesses has not yet been formu-
lated. However, it is anticipated that such a list would 
include those named in paragraph Kb) above. If witnesses are 
to come from outside this list or the parties, the answer will 
be supplemented with the name of the anticipated witness. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: Identify each person who you 
expect to or may call as an expert witness at trial. For each 
such expert state the following: 
(a) The subject matter about which the expert 
is expected to testify; and 
(b) The substance of the facts and opinions 
to which the expert is expected to testify. 
(c) A summary of the grounds for each such 
opinion; and 
(d) The fee and/or expenses to be paid to each 
such expert. 
ANSWER: See paragraph 20 ioove. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Identify each document that 
you intend to or may introduce for *ny purpose at trial. For 
each such document, identify the witness whom you expect will 
lay the foundation for its admission. 
-16-
AHSWER: A list of documents has not yet been formu-
lated. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 23: State all known addresses and 
telephone numbers, both current and past, of Defendant John B. 
Swank. 
ANSWER: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 24: Is J & D Properties a Cali-
fornia partnership? If so, state the nature of the partnership 
(i.e., general of limited), the identities of each partner, 
including their respective share of ownership and whether the 
partner is a general or limited partner, and the business 
address of the partnership. 
ANSWER: No 
INTERROGATORY NO. 25: If your answer to the preceding 
interrogatory is no, identify the precise nature of J & D 
Properties (i.e., corporation or other form of business entity), 
its state of incorporation (if relevant) and its principal 
place of business. 
ANSWER: J i D Properties, Inc. was supposed to be a 
corporation, which status as a Utah corporation was to have 
been set up and verified by Jeff Perkins. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 26: Is Allyn and Company a Cali-
fornia partnership? If so, state the nature of the partnership 
(i.e., general or limited), the identites of each partner, 
including their respective share of ownership and whether the 
-17-
partner is a general or limited partner, and the business 
address of the partnership. 
ANSWER: Yes, a general partnership who^e address is 
GENERAL PARTNERS SHARE OF OWNERSHIP 
Douglas Kent Allyn 
Richard J. Allyn 
INTERROGATORY NO. 27: If your answer, to the pre-
ceding interrogatory is no, identify the precise nature of 
Allyn and Company (i.e., corporation or other form of business 
entity), its state of incorporation (if relevant) and its 
principal place of business. 
ANSWER: Not applicable 
Dated this a^ a? day of £**%, 1988. 
STATE OF tJTftH / . 
County of .Salfc Loflto 
Douglas Kent Allyn 
w '~fu 
)ss, 
SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ^J J) day of ft 1988. 
tary Pufilic ' V 
My Commission Expires: 
No bl
Residing at: ^ a 
MARY ANN KLUG 
<40rAPYPu8w.C CA*..fO*NiA 
SAA OiEOOCCtHTr 
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CERTIPICATB OF MAILI8G 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Response to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories on this day of June, 1988, postage 
prepaid to John A. Anderson, VAN COTT, 3AGLEY, CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY at 50 South Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84145. 
JOHN BURTON ANDERSON *0 092 
Anderson & Dunn 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 20Q 
Salt Lake C.ityf Utah 84121 
Telephone: (301) 944-0990 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba Interlake Thrift -
Mortgage Division, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN B. SWANK, DOUGLAS KENT 
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES, 
a California Partnership; 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and RICHARD 
JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND 
COMPANY, a California 
Partnership, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
The Affiant, Kent Allyn, being first duly sworn >ioon 
oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That he is competent to testify as a witness and 
personally knows the facts stated herein are true. 
2. That in connection with the loan transaction 
between Douglas Kent Allyn and Richard John Allvn, 3r., dba 
Allyn and Company and Interlake Thrift and is the subiect oc 
the above-entitled litigation, the following is true to the 
best of Affiant's understanding an.l knowledge: 
AFFIDAVIT QV 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN 
Civil Mo. C86-6726 
-2-
a. The project vhich is the subiect o* the loan 
made by Interlake Thrift to Affiant and to the 
other parties involved in this transaction was 
presented tc these parties by Jeff Perkins who 
at the time was an officer of Plaintiff. 
b. Said Jeff Perkins oarticioated in putting 
the purchase of the property bv these parties 
together and upon information and belief, he, 
together with his employer, Tnterlake Thrift, 
received a commission from the seller of the 
property involved in the transaction. 
c. The initial money for the down payment in 
this transaction came from the loan amount made 
by Interlake Thrift to Mr. John Swank for the 
purchase of a separate project known as Parkway 
Village. 
d« Because efforts at getting a construction 
loan had failed, Plaintiff had agreed to advance 
funds in the amount of $200,000.00 to J & D 
Properties, Inc., which said Perkins had reore-
sented to be a valid corporation under the laws 
of the State of <Jtah in order to close the 
purchase of the land as part of the project. 
e. All signings by those Defendants were as 
corporate officers and not as individuals based 
on representations made by Perkins. 
f. After conversations with Perkins and as a 
means of accounting, Interlake Thrift and Perkins 
assured Affiant and others that there would be 
no personal liability tow^M then as oart of the 
transaction and the parties then consented to 
signing for part of the Loan. 
g. That Perkins represented that if the proiect 
did not go forward, Tnterlake Thrift woul1 look 
only to the property vvl net to the Defendant's 
individually for ca' i ^ ra :t ion. According!'/, 
Affiant and Richard '•;,-*. ? Allyn siqned the loan 
documents on that basi-:. 
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3, That the above information has been recited ani 
given under oath to Plaintiff's as part of the "Response to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories" dated Julv 22, 19R8 
and signed by Affiant and Richard John Allyn, a cooy o* which 
v/as delivered to Plaintiff. 
4. That the purpose of this Affidavit is to demon-
strate the existance of questions of fact with respect to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintifc in this matter. 
DATED this /± day of December, 1989. 
-. :LAL 
I ^ \ JANE A. GUTHRIE } 
J PP1N« F^LCr^-'-C 'N ,...... - : — IN'Y ., i <c MIV )i :?n Douglas'Hent Allyn T 
SUBSCRIBED, SWORN TO AND ACKNOWLEDGED before me tM* 
/ •<;'-** day of December, 1989. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
T ± 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Doualas Kent Allyn on tMs 
IY day of December, 1989, oostaqe oreoaid to John A. 
Anderson, VAN COTT, 3AGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY ac SO South 
Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt Lake City, Utah R4145, 
./:>. :ifU"-K/l 
t : - ~ r -•» r ^ ^ D ^ D :•** 
/ -5-- ^ 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Thomas T. Billings, Bar No. 0331 
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba Interlake Thrift -
Mortgage Division, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS 
KENT ALLYN dba J & D 
PROPERTIES, a California 
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT 
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN 
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND 
COMPANY, a California 
Partnership, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM 
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-6726 
Honorable John A. Rokich 
Plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, dba Interlake 
Thrift - Mortgage Division (Interlake") submits the following 
reply points and authorities in support of its motions for 
summary judgment and default judgment and in response to the 
opposition memorandum filed ry : — " - • • ! -a :i t s Douglas Kent Ailyn, 
Richard John Allyn, and Allyn ±:\.i Jimpany (collectively the 
"Allyn Defendants'). 
1-
G: WPL 159 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 . W 5 0 EXHIBIT F 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff filed this action to collect two promissory 
notes and foreclose two deeds of trust encumbering the same real 
property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (the 
"Property"). The two promissory notes and deeds of trust (trust 
deeds") are separately identified in plaintiff's memorandum of 
points and authorities as the "Interlake Thrift Loan" and the 
"Commerce Financial Loan." The Interlake Thrift Loan was made m 
October, 1985, and the trust deed was recorded in March, 1986. 
The Commerce Financial Loan was made in November, 1985, and the 
trust deed securing that loan was recorded the following day, on 
November 6, 19 85. 
Commerce Financial Loan 
Defendant John Swank, who executed the Commerce 
Financial Note and trust deed is in default and has not responded 
to the present motion for default judgment. The facts concerning 
the Commerce Financial Loan are not in dispute and have not been 
contested by the Allyn Defendants. Accordingly, this Court 
should order the sale of the subject property in satisfaction o: 
said default, with a deficiency judgment to be entered against 
Swank. This Court should also declare that the Commerce Financial 
trust deed is senior to and takes priority over the trust deed 
securing the Interlake Thrift L:a:i since it was recorded prior in 
time. Plaintiff anticipates that the sale proceeds of the subject 
G:\WPL 159 00000101.W50 
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property will not exceed the amount presently due and owing on 
the Commerce Financial Loan. 
Interlake Thrift Loan 
With respect to the Interlake Thrift Loan, plaintiff 
alleges that both Douglas Kent Allyn and John B. Swank are 
jointly and severally liable for payment of the promissory note. 
Additionally, there is no dispute that Douglas Allyn executed an 
assignment in behalf of Allyn and Company of its interest in a 
California limited partnership known as PRB, Ltd. Finally, the 
Allyn Defendants have not disputed the facts set forth in 
plaintiff's memorandum of points and authorities to the effect 
that the promissory note and trust deed were executed by Douglas 
Allyn and John Swank and that the parties are in default 
thereunder. 
Douglas Allyn's defense alleges (1) that his execution 
of the Interlake Thrift Loan documents was in behalf of J & D 
Properties, Inc., a corporation to which the funds were to have 
been disbursed and which was to have been incorporated under the 
laws of the State of Utah, and (2) prior to executing the subject: 
loan documents, Allyn was assured by Jeff Perkins, an officer of 
Interlake Thrift, that he would have no personal liability in the 
event of a default. 
Interlake Thrift contends, however, that Douglas 
Allyn's unsubstantiated and self-serving allegations regarding 
G:\WPL\i59\00000i01.w50 
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both his capacity in executing the loan documents and his 
personal liability are inadmissible under the parol evidence 
rule. Further, even assuming that Douglas Allyn executed the 
loan documents in behalf of J & D Properties, Inc., there is no 
reference to that fact on the Promissory Note. Under Utah law, 
unless the instrument clearly indicates that the signature is 
made in some other capacity, it is a personal indorsement of the 
signator. Moreover, the signature of an authorized 
representative who signs his own name to an instrument personally 
obligates the representative on the instrument if the instrument 
neither names the person represented nor shows that the 
representative signed in a representative capacity. Since the 
subject promissory note indicates absolutely no representative 
capacity and makes no reference whatsoever to J & D Properties, 
Inc, then even if J & D Properties had been validly incorporated, 
Douglas Allyn would be personally liable on the subject 
promissory note. Likewise, the trust deed clearly indicates that 
it is being executed by Douglas Allyn in its individual capacity. 
Finally, Allyn has not alleged and there is no evidence 
that J & D Properties, Inc. was ever incorporated in the State of 
Utah or elsewhere. It is well established that where there has 
been a defective incorporation, the incorporators are personally 
liable for the contracts of the putative corporation. Thus, to 
the extent Allyn claims to have executed the loan documents in 
G:\WPL\159\00000101.W50 
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behalf of a corporation of which he apparently was to have been 
an officer, but which was never validly incorporated, he is 
personally liable on those loan documents. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT ALLYN'S AFFIDAVIT 
Defendant Douglas Kent Allyn has filed an affidavit in 
support of his opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment. This affidavit alleges in Subparagraphs (a) through 
(g) of Paragraph 2 certain "facts" to which Interlake Thrift 
hereby responds in order to demonstrate that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact that may properly be admitted into 
evidence. 
1. With respect to Subparagraph 2(a), Interlake 
Thrift will admit that allegation solely for the purpose of this 
motion and for no other purpose. However, this allegation is 
completely irrelevant to the disposition of this motion. 
2. With respect to Subparagraph 2(b), Interlake 
Thrift moves to strike this paragraph on the basis it is 
irrelevant and lacks foundation. Interlake Thrift will admit for 
purposes of this motion, however, that it did receive a customary 
loan origination fee (rather than a commission) as a result of 
this loan transaction. 
3. With respect to Subparagraph 2(c), Interlake 
Thrift moves to strike this subparagraph on the grounds it lacks 
foundation. Again, however, this allegation is irrelevant. 
G: WPL 159 0000010L.W50 
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4. With respect to Subparagraph 2(d), Interlake 
Thrift moves to strike these allegations on the grounds they are 
inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. The subject loan 
documents are not in dispute and clearly and unambiguously 
provide for the individual liability of Swank and Allyn. 
5. With respect to Subparagraphs 2(e), 2(f), and 
2(g), Interlake Thrift objects to these allegations and moves to 
strike them on the grounds they are inadmissible under the parol 
evidence rule. 
6. With respect to Paragraph 3, Interlake Thrift 
objects to incorporation of the Allyns* own responses to 
interrogatories on the grounds such evidence is inadmissible in 
response to a motion for summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SWANK IS IN DEFAULT UNDER THE COMMERCE FINANCIAL LOAN. 
INTERLAKE THRIFT IS, THEREFORE, ENTITLED TO AN ORDER 
FORECLOSING THE trust deed SECURING THAT LOAN. 
Swank is in default under the Commerce Financial Loan 
which was assigned in July, 1986 to Interlake Thrift. There is 
no dispute regarding any facts relating to or concerning this 
loan and, therefore, Interlake Thrift is clearly entitled to an 
order selling the subject property in satisfaction of this loan. 
Further, Interlake Thrift is entitled to an order establishing 
the priority of the Commerce Fina:1. Lai trust deed based on the 
fact it was recorded several tenths prior to the Interlake Thrift 
G:\WPL\159\00000101.W50 
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trust deed. The Allyns have not disputed plaintiff's entitlement 
to this relief. 
II. DEFENDANTS DO NOT DISPUTE THAT THERE IS A DEFAULT IN 
THE UNDERLYING INTERLAKE THRIFT LOAN TRANSACTION. 
xMOREOVER, DEFENDANTS HAVE INTRODUCED NO COMPETENT OR 
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THEY ARE NOT 
PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE DEFAULT IN SAID LOAN 
TRANSACTION. 
Swank is also in default with respect to the Interiake 
Thrift loan transaction. Plaintiff is entitled to an order 
granting default judgment and selling the subject property, and 
to entry of a deficiency judgment as a result of this default. 
Further, the Allyns have not disputed the default in the 
underlying obligation nor that there was a valid assignment of 
Allyn & Company's partnership interest in PRB, Ltd. as security 
for this indebtedness. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to an 
order selling the subject Property and Allyn and Company's 
interest in PRB, Ltd. in satisfaction of this indebtedness. 
The Allyns only defense is that they are not personally 
liable for any deficiency because (1) they executed the Interiake 
Thrift Loan documents in behalf of J & D Properties, Inc., which 
they concede was never validly incorporated in Utah or any other 
state, and (2) they were assured prior to executing these 
documents that in the event of a default, the lender would look 
only to the property and not to them personally for satisfaction 
of the loan. 
G:\WPL\L59\00000101.W50 
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1. The Parol Evidence Rule Bars Admission of Evident 
Offered to Vary or Contradict the Terms of a 
Written Instrument. 
Utah follows the well established rule that parol 
evidence may not be introduced to add to, vary or contradict the 
terms of a written instrument. In Younaren v. Lloyd Construction 
Company, Inc. , 450 P.2d 985 (Utah 1969), the Utah Supreme Court 
definded the rule as follows: 
When parties have negotiated on a subject and 
have thereafter entered into a written 
contract, it should be assumed that their 
prior negotiations are fused into the 
contract so that it represents their full 
agreement with respect thereto; and that, 
consequently, after its due execution, 
extraneous evidence should ordinarily not be 
permitted to add to, subtract from, vary, or 
contradict it. 
Id. at 987. Accordingly, Douglas Allyn's unsubstantiated and 
self serving allegation that he executed all loan documents in 
behalf of J & D Properties, Inc. should not be admitted when it 
is clear from the face of the promissory note that he is 
individually liable and there is absolutely no reference therein 
to J & D Properties, Inc. Likewise, since the trust deed clearly 
and unambiguously provides that he is executing it in his 
individual capacity, parol evidence should not be introduced to 
contradict that provision. 
Similarly, Allyn's assertion that he was assured prior 
to executing the loan documents that he would have no personal 
liability in the event of default is inadmissible. The 
-8-
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promissory note (Exhibit "A") states that the undersigned (Swank 
and Allyn) jointly and severally promise to pay the principal 
balance plus interest to Interlake Thrift. Although the 
promissory note later refers to the fact that it is secured by a 
trust deed on real property, it makes absolutely no reference to 
this trust deed as being Interlake Thrift's sole recourse in the 
event of default. Thus, Allyn's testimony is offered solely to 
add to, vary and/or contradict the express terms of the 
promissory note.1 It is this promissory note that defines 
Douglas Allyn's rights and obligations in the event of default. 
2. Allyn's Signature on the Promissory Note Obligates 
Him Personally for Payment of the Sums Due 
Thereunder. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-402 provides that "Unless the 
instrument clearly indicates that a signature is made in some 
other capacity, it is an indorsement." Since Allyn's signature 
on the promissory note does not indicate that he is signing in 
some other capacity, he is deemed to have indorsed the instrument 
and is personally liable thereunder. 
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-403 provides that an 
authorized representative who signs in his own name "is 
The trust deed also indicates that Douglas Allyn is executing 
it in his individual capacity. Although there is a reference to 
J & D Properties, Inc. as well, both Allyn and Swank executed in 
behalf of J & D Properties, Inc. and in their individual 
capacities. Consequently, there is no question that Allyn is also 
liable on the trust deed. 
G:\WPL\159\00000101.W50 
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California partnership. At the time the documentation referred 
to therein was executed by Defendants, Defendants were led to 
believe that they were executing the sane as 2 coroorati.cn 
which mistaken belief was given to the^ Vv m occicer cF 
Plaintiff viz., Jeff Perkins. 
All of such documentation used in the transaction was 
prepared by Plaintiff and was based OP. misrepresentation anl 
fraudulent statements made by said Jeff Perking an officer of 
Plaintiff, as more particularly set forth in the Affidavit of 
Douglas Kent Allyn, which is attached hereto. The additional 
facts as contained in said Affidavit are set forth as follows: 
a. The project which is the subiect of the loan 
made by Tnterlake Thrift to Affiant and to the 
other parties involved in this transaction was 
presented to these parties by Jeff Perkins who 
at the time was an officer of Plaintiff. 
b. Said Jeff Perkins participated in outtina 
the purchase of the property bv these parties 
together and upon information and belief, he, 
together with his employer, Tnterlake Thrift, 
received a commission from the seller of t^e 
property involved in the transaction. 
c. The initial money for the down payment in 
this transaction came from the loan amount ma^^ 
by Interlake Thrift to Mr. John Swank for the 
purchase of a separate project known as Parkwav 
Village. 
d. Because efforts at getting a construction 
loan had failed, Plaintiff nad aareed to advance 
funds in the amount of $200,000.00 to J & n 
Properties, Inc., which said Perkins had repre-
sented to be a valid corporation 'inder the laws 
of the State of Utah in order to close the 
purchase of the land as part of the oroiect. 
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e. All signings by those Defendants were as 
corporate officers and nor: as individuals based 
on representations made by Perkins. 
f. After conversations v:ith Perkins and as a 
means of accounting, Interlace Thrift and Perkins 
assured Affiant and others that there would he 
no personal liability toward them as oart oF the 
transaction and the parties then consented to 
signing for part of the loan. 
g. That Perkins represented that if the project 
did not go forward, Interlake Thrift would look 
only to the property and not to the Defendant's 
individually for satisfaction. Accordinalv, 
Affiant and Richard John Allyn sianed the loan 
documents on that basis. 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In order for Plaintiff to prevail on its Motion for 
Summary Judgment it must be shown that, based on the pleadings 
and the affidavits of the parties, there is no issue as to anv 
material fact and that the party is entitled to iudqment as a 
matter of law. Orwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d, 595 CJtah). 
As to Points IT, III and IV, all of the saire are 
based on facts propounded by Plaintiff but which are contested 
by Defendant. Plaintiff merely recites those matters which ^re 
shown on the face of the documentation which supoosedlv estab-
lishes the liability of the Defendants herein. 
Other important cactors in the transaction whir*h 
lead to the signing of the documentation are completely 
ignored by Plaintiff, which "actors, when thorouahlv and 
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accurately placed before a trier for adeauate consideration, 
would show the transaction to be not onlv invalid but e^en 
fraudulent on the part of Plaintiff. ("?efer to the Xzxoon^e 
of Defendants, Douglas Kent and Richard John Allvn Sr., to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, oaraaraoh 2, served 
upon the Plaintiff on July 21, 1983, together with responses 
of said Defendants to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions 
served upon Plaintiff on June 22, 198$. Also- refer to sai<* 
Affidavit of Douglas Kent Allvn which is attached to the 
Memorandum.) 
CONCLUSION 
Since there is a question of fact as to whether or 
not Plaintiff made misrepresentations and fraudulent state-
ments to said Defendants as to their personal liability in the 
transaction, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
denied. / 
DATED this y/^^day of December, 1989. 
^4(^^T 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I hereby certify tnat ' -lail-H a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Memoran,: :~> in wpoosition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment on this /
 L'j "U / of December, 19P9, oostaa^ 
prepaid to John A. Anderson, *-v? c^r, 3A0LFY, CORMWA- r z 
MCCARTHY, 50 South Main Streo-, ^ ii\* 1610, P.O. Box 4S<^\ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34145. 
/ 
i 
J r /. / <"^ ,- .1 y)<~ . f / 
JOHN BURTON ANDERSON #0092 
KEVIN V. OLSEN #4105 
Anderson & Dunn 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200 
Sale Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801) 944-0990 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATS OF UTAH 
USA FINACIAL CORPORATION, 
dba Interlake Thrift -
Mortgage Division, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS KENT 
ALLYN dba J & D PROPERTIES, 
a California Partnership; DOUGLAS 
KENT ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN ALLYN, 
SR., dba ALLYN AND COMPANY, 
a California Partnership, 
Defendants* 
Come now, the Defendants, Douglas Kent Allyn, 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. and Allyn and Company, a California 
Partnership and pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure respond to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories 
as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: With respect to Plaintiff's 
First Set of Requests for Admissions, if your response to any 
such request was anything but an unqualified admission, state 
the following: 
{
^ 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES 
Civil No. C86-6726 
Honorable John A. Rokich 
-2-
a. All facts on which you base your denial or 
response; 
b. All pe sons with knowledge of facts that 
will substantiate your denial or response, including a brief 
summary of each person's relevant knowledge; and 
c. All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate to or substantiate your denial or response. 
ANSWER: (a) See Amended Responses to Request for 
Admissions. 
(b) Jeff Perkins - Vice President of Inter-
lake Thrift. Chris Davis - Secretary for Jeff Perkins. Doug 
Arnett - Involved with Mr. Perkins under similar circumstances. 
(c) All documents are in possession of 
Plaintiff. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: With respect to your denial of 
the allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of the Complaint, 
state the following: 
(a) All facts on which you base your denial; 
(b) All persons with knowledge of facts that 
relate to your denial, including a brief statement of the 
substance of each such person's knowledge; and 
(c) All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate, or substantiate your denial. 
ANSWER: (a) This project, like the Parkway Village 
project, was purchased with the assi.stanco of Jeff Perkins. 
-3-
in fact, either Perkins or Interlace received a commission 
from Commerce Financial for the sale of this project. The 
initial money down for this transaction came from the amount 
funded to Swank for the purchase of his part of Parkway Village. 
Because efforts at getting a construction loan failed, Inter-
lake agreed to advance funds to J & D Properties, Inc. to 
close the purchase of the land. J » D Properties, Inc. is the 
name Perkins represented to have had cleared with the state 
prior to making the loan. Originally, title to the land and 
the loan were to be in the name of the corporation. Commerce 
Financial, however, had requested that their loan be made to 
Swank since their documentation was already set up that way. 
Douglas Kent Allyn signed Exhibits A, B and D as an officer of 
J & D Properties, Inc. He also understood Swank signed Exhibit 
A, B, D, E and F as an officer of J & D Properties, Inc. In 
addition to relying on Perkins as far as the corporation went, 
these Defendants relied on other representations explained in 
paragraph 2(a) of these Defendants Responses to Interrogatories 
for Case No. C86-6724, which is incorporated by this reference. 
Not only were Defendants induced to sign documents, they also 
assigned other property to Interlace as additional collateral 
for the transaction. All funds went to the project and not to 
these Defendants personally. 
(b) See paragraph Kb) above. 
(c) See paragraph 1(c) above. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 3: With respect to your denial of 
the allegations set forth in paragraph 9 of the Complaint, 
state the following: 
(a) All the facts on which you base your 
denial; 
(b) All persons with knowledge of the facts 
that relate to your denial, including a brief statement of the 
substance of each such person's knowledge? and 
(c) All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate, or substantiate your denial. 
ANSWER: (a) See paragraph 2(a) above. 
(b) See paragraph Kb) above, 
(c) See paragraph 1(c) above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: With respect to your denial of 
the allegations set forth in paragraph 9 of the Complaint, 
state the following: 
(a) All facts on which you base your denial; 
(b) All persons with knowledge of facts that 
relate to your denial, including a brief statement of the 
substance of each such person's knowledge; and 
(c) All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate, or substantiate your denial. 
ANSWER: (a) See paragraph 2(a) above. 
(b) See paragraph 1(b) above. 
(c) See paragraph 1(c) above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: With respect to your denial of 
the allegations set forth in paragraph 10 of the Complaint, 
state the following: 
(a) All facts on which you base your denial; 
(b) All persons with knowledge of facts that 
relate to your denial, including a brief statement of the 
substance of each such person's knowledge; and 
(c) All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate, or substantiate your denial 
ANSWER: (a) See paragraph 2(a) above, 
(b) See paragraph Kb) above. 
(c) See paragraph 1(c) above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: With respect to your denial of 
the allegations set forth in paragraph 11 of the Complaint, 
state the following: 
(a) All facts on which you base your denial; 
(b) All persons with knowledge of facts that 
relate to your denial, including a brief statement of the 
substance of each such person's knowledge; and 
(c) All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate, or substantiate your denial. 
ANSWEB: (a) See parage iph 2(a) above. 
(b) See paragraph Kb) above. 
(c) See paragraoh !(:) above. 
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INTRRROGATORY NO. 7: With respect to your denial of 
the allegations set forth in paragraph 12 of the Complaint, 
state the following: 
(a) All facts on which you base your denial; 
(b) All persons with knowledge of facts that 
relate to your denial, including a brief statement of the 
substance of each such person's knowledge; and 
(c) All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate, or substantiate your denial, 
ANSWER: (a) See paragraph 2(a) above. 
(b) See paragraph Kb) above. 
(c) See paragraph 1(c) above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: With respect to your denial of 
the allegations set forth in paragraph 13 of the Complaint, 
state the following: 
(a) All facts on which you base your denial; 
(b) All persons with knowledge of facts that 
relate to your denial, including a brief statement of the 
substance of each such person's knowledge; and 
(c) All documents '.hat discuss, reflect, 
relate, or substantiate your denial. 
ANSWER: (a) See paragraph 2(a) above. 
(b) See paragraph 1(b) above. 
(c) See paragraph 1(c) above. 
-7-
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: With respect to your denial of 
the allegations set forth in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, 
state the following: 
(a) All facts on which you oase your denial; 
(b) All persons with knowledge of facts that 
relate to your denial, including a brief statement of the 
substance of each such person's knowledge; and 
(c) All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate, or substantiate your denial. 
ANSWER: (a) See paragraph 2(a) above. 
(b) See paragraph Kb) above. 
(c) See paragraph 1(c) above. 
INTERROGATORY HO. 10: Do you contend that Exhibit 
"A" to Complaint 86-6724 is void and of no force and effect 
upon the Defendants? If so, state the following: 
(a) The facts on which you base this conten-
tion, including but not limited to the following: 
1. All misrepresentations by Plaintiff; 
2. All fraudulent omissions by Plaintiff; 
3. All "unfair" dots of Plaintiff as referred 
to in paragraph 4 of your Answer; and 
4. All affairs of Defendants that Plaintiff 
entered into and assumed as part of the underlying transactions 
as set forth in paragraph 4 of your Answer; 
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(b) Identify all persons with knowledge of 
any facts that substantiate such contention, including a brief 
summary of each such person's knowledge; and 
(c) All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate to or substantiate such contention. 
ANSWER: Yes 
(a) See paragraph 2(a) above. 
(b) See paragraph 1(b) above. 
(c) See paragraph 1(c) above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. Ill Do you contend that Exhibit 
"B" to Complaint 86-6724 is void and of no force and effect 
upon the Defendants? If so, state the following: 
(a) The facts on which you base this conten-
tion, including but not limited to the following: 
1. All misrepresentations by Plaintiff; 
2. All fraudulent omissions by Plaintiff; 
3. All "unfair" acts of Plaintiff as referred 
to in paragraph 5 of your Answer; and 
4. All affairs of Defendants that Plaintiff 
entered into and assumed as part of the underlying transactions 
as set forth in paragraph 5 of your Answer; 
(b) Identify all persons with knowledge of 
any facts that substantiate such contention, including a brief 
summary of each such person's knowledge; and 
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(c) All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate to or substantiate such contention. 
AHStfBR: Yes 
(a) See paragraph 2(a) above. 
(b) See paragraph Kb) above, 
(c) See paragraph 1(c) above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Do you contend that Exhibit 
"C* to Complaint 86-6724 is void and of no force and effect 
upon the Defendants? If so, state the following: 
(a) The facts on which you base this conten-
tion, including but not limited to the following: 
1. All misrepresentations by Plaintiff; 
2. All fraudulent omissions by Plaintiff; 
3. All "unfair" acts of Plaintiff as referred 
to in paragraph 6 of your Answer; and 
4. All affairs of Defendants that Plaintiff 
entered into and assumed as part of the underlying transactions 
as set forth in paragraph 6 of your Answer? 
(b) Identify all persons with knowledge of 
any facts that substantiate such conception, including a brief 
summary of each such person's knowledge; and 
(c) All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate to or substantiate such contention. 
ANSWER: Yes 
(a) See paragraph 2(a) above. 
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(b) See paragraph 1(b) above. 
(c) See paragraph lie) above. 
INTERROGATORY BO, 13: Do you contend that Exhibit 
"D" to Complaint 86-6724 is void and of no force and effect 
upon the Defendants? If so, state the following: 
(a) The facts on which you base this conten-
tion, including but not limited to the following: 
1. All misrepresentations by Plaintiff; 
2. All fraudulent omissions by Plaintiff; 
3. Ail "unfair" acts of Plaintiff as referred 
to in paragraph 7 of your Answer; and 
4. All affairs of Defendants that Plaintiff 
entered into and assumed as part of the underlying transactions 
as set forth- in paragraph 7 of your Answer; 
(b) Identify all persons with knowledge of 
any facts that substantiate such contention, including a brief 
summary of each such person's knowledge; and 
(c) All documents that discuss, reflect, 
relate to or substantiate such contention. 
ABSVBRt Yes 
(a) See paragraph 2(a) above, 
(b) See paragraph lib) above. 
(c) See paragraph 1(c) above. 
personally obligated if the instrument neither names the person 
represented nor shows that the representative signed in a 
representative capacity. . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-403(2)(a) 
(1980). Again, even if Allyn intended to sign the Promissory 
Note in a representative capacity, since there is absolutely no 
reference to J & D Properties, Inc. in the note or to his 
representative capacity, Allyn is personally obligated on the 
note. 
While it is true that the trust deed, in contrast to 
the promissory note, makes reference to J & D Properties, Inc., 
and Douglas Allyn apparently did execute that document in a 
representative capacity, it is undisputed that he also executed 
the trust deed in his individual capacity. The signature line 
clearly states that he is executing it in a dual capacity. 
Further, the trust deed does not establish his personal liability 
in the event of a default; rather, that liability is established 
by the promissory note. The trust deed merely encumbers the 
property as security for the underlying obligation. Thus, even 
if Allyn had properly executed the trust deed only in behalf of J 
& D Properties, Inc., that would not excuse his personal 
liability on the promissory note, which bears no such 
indorsement. Since these documents were executed 
contemporaneously, but there is no reference whatsoever in the 
promissory note to J & D Properties, Inc., it is clear that 
G:\WPL\159\00000101.W50 
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Allyn's defense is frivolous and interposed solely for the 
purpose of delay. 
3- The Allvns Have Not Alleged nor Offered ^ ny 
Evidence to Establish that J & D Properties, Tpr 
Was Sv?g IncoTPQm?d- Accordingly, the Allyna 
Are Personally Liable for the Purported Contracts 
Qt J & P ?r9P«tw f Inc« 
Allyn alleges that he executed the Interlake Thrift 
Loan documents in behalf of J & D Properties, Inc. In order for 
Allyn to so execute those documents, he would have had to have 
been an authorized representative, agent or officer of that 
corporation. Allyn does not allege, however, that J & D 
Properties, Inc. was ever incorporated in Utah or in any other 
state. 
It is well established that where a corporation is 
never incorporated, or defectively incorporated, persons who 
execute contracts in behalf of the corporation are personally 
liable for the debts and obligations reflected by those 
agreements. Utah Code Ann. S 16-10-139 provides that "All 
persons who assume to act as a corporation without authority so 
to do shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts and 
liabilities incurred or arising as a result thereof." Utah Code 
Ann. S 16-10-139 (1980). In gjUfram Advertising Ag?h?Yr Inc. v. 
Ipson, 567 P.2d 163 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
where the defendant executed an agreement in behalf of a 
G:\WPl\159\0000010L.W50 
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corporation that did not exist, he was personally liable on the 
obligation. Id. at 165. 
Even assuming that Allyn had executed the promissory 
note itself in behalf of J & D Properties, Inc., since there is 
no evidence offered to prove that J & D Properties, Inc. was ever 
incorporated, Allyn is personally liable on the promissory note. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment on the 
Commerce Financial Loan against John Swank. Accordingly, 
defendant is entitled to a sale of the trust deed property and to 
entry of a deficiency judgment against Swank arising from such 
sale. 
Defendants have not contested the underlying liability 
owed on the Interlake Thrift Loan nor default in the repayment of 
that loan. Defendants' only evidence offered in response to 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is barred by the parol 
evidence rule as it is intended to add to, vary or contradict the 
terms of a clear and unambiguous written instrument. Further, 
Allyn is liable in his personal capacity as an alleged 
representative of J & D Properties, Inc. because he failed to 
execute the promissory note in that capacity. Finally, since 
there is no evidence that J & D Properties, Inc. was ever 
incorporated, Allyn is personally liable under Utah law for any 
contracts purportedly executed in behalf of that nonexistent 
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corporation. For these reasons, Interlake Thrift is also 
entitled to an order applying the proceeds from the sale of the 
trust deed property remaining after satisfaction of the Commerce 
Financial Loan, if any, to the Interlake Thrift Loan. In the 
event no such proceeds exist or are inadequate to satisfy the 
Interlake Thrift Loan, then Interlake Thrift is entitled to a 
judgment personally against Douglas Kent Allyn and a judgment 
foreclosing Allyn and Company's interest in the limited 
partnership known as PRB, Ltd. 
DATED this [\.ll^ day of January, 1990. 
VAN COTT, BAGLByy) CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
i. A^rt^ S^ 
"John /A. Jutererson 
Attorneys for P la in t i f f 
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CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Motions for Summary Judgment and Default Judgment 
was mailed, postage prepaid, this f Vf^day of January, 1990, to 
the following: 
John B. Swank 
114 Flag Way 
Pasa Robles, California 93447 
John Burton Anderson, Esq. 
ANDERSON & DUNN 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Allyn and Company 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 9 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
SWANK, JOHN B 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 860906726 CV 
DATE 01/24/90 
HONORABLE JOHN A ROKICH 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK MTR 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. ANDERSON, JOHN A. 
D. ATTY. ANDERSON, JOHN B. 
THE COURT RULES ON REQUEST FOR RULING TO WIT; 
"PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFAULT JUDG-
MENT ARE GRANTED FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFF'S MEMOR-
ANDUM." 
CC JOHN A. ANDERSON 
JOHN B. ANDERSON 
EXHIBIT G 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, ) 
dba Interlake Thrift - ) 
Mortgage Division, a Utah ) 
corporation, ) ORDER AND DECREE 
) OF FORECLOSURE 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS ) 
KENT ALLYN dba J & D ) 
PROPERTIES, a California ) Civil No. C86-6724 
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT ) 
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN ) Honorable Timothy R. Hanso 
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND ) 
COMPANY, a California ) 
Partnership, ) 
Defendants. ) 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba Interlake Thrift -
Mortgage Division, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN B. SWANK an individual, 
DOUGLAS KENT ALLYN and 
RICHARD JOHN ALLYN, SR., dba 
ALLYN AND COMPANY, a 
partnership; all dba Parkway 
Village, a Joint Venture, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C86-6725 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
EXHIBIT H 
Plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, dba Interlake 
Thrift - Mortgage Division ("Interlake") having moved for entry 
of a default judgment against defendant John B. Swank, whose 
default was entered by the Clerk of this Court on February 23, 
1989; and Interlake having moved for summary judgment against 
defendants Douglas Kent Allyn, Richard John Allyn, Sr., and Allyn 
and Company (the "Allyn Defendants"), and this Court having 
entered its Minute Entry dated January 5, 1990, granting 
plaintiff's motions for entry of default and summary judgments, 
and having denied the ex parte motion of the Allyn defendants for 
additional time within which to file a response to the motion for 
summary judgment, and good cause appearing herefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The ex parte motion of the Allyn Defendants for 
additional time within which to file a response to plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment is hereby denied. 
2. The motion of plaintiff Interlake for default 
judgment against defendant John B. Swank is hereby granted. 
3. The motion of plaintiff Interlake for summary 
judgment against defendants Douglas Kent Allyn, Richard John 
Allyn, and Allyn and Company, a California partnership, is hereby 
granted. 
4. There is now due and owing to Interlake under that 
certain Promissory Note dated May 29, 1985 (Loan No. L100142) 
G:\WPL\159\00000239.W50 
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(the "First Promissory Note") the sum of $643,560.98, which sum 
includes outstanding principal and interest to and including 
January 19, 1990. Interest continues to accrue on the First 
Promissory Note at the per diem rate of $166.53. 
5. That certain Deed of Trust with Assignment of 
Rents ("First Trust Deed") duly recorded in the Office of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder on October 10, 1985 as Entry No. 
4149377 at Book 5899, Page 612, and rerecorded to correct an 
error in the legal description on December 4, 1988 as Entry No. 
4171946, at Book 4714, Page 2804, constitutes a valid, perfected, 
first-priority lien in favor of Interlake upon the following 
described real property (the "Property") situated in Salt Lake 
County, Utah to-wit: 
Parcels 1, 2, and 3 as described in the attached 
Exhibit A. 
6. There is now due and owing to Interlake under that 
certain Promissory Note dated May 29, 1985 (Loan No. L100141) 
(the "Second Promissory Note") the sum of $354,034.33, which sum 
includes outstanding principal and interest to and including 
January 19, 1990. Interest continues to accrue on the Second 
Promissory Note at the per diem rate of $79.77. 
7. That certain Deed of Trust with Assignment of 
Rents ("Second Trust Deed") duly recorded in the Office of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder on October 10, 1985 as Entry No. 
4149379 at Book 5699, Page 619, constitutes a valid, perfected, 
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second-priority lien in favor of Interlake upon the following 
described real property (the "Property") situated in Salt Lake 
County, Utah to-wit: 
Parcel 1 as described in the attached Exhibit 
"A. " 
8. There is now due and owing to Interlake under that 
certain Promissory Note dated March 31, 1986 (Loan 9141) (the 
"Fourth Promissory Note") the sum of $198,877.63, which sum 
includes outstanding principal and accrued interest to and 
including January 19, 1990. Interest continues to accrue on the 
Fourth Promissory Note at the per diem rate of $51.46. 
9. That certain Deed of Trust with Assignment of 
Rents (the "Fourth Trust Deed") duly recorded in the Office of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder on March 21, 1986 as Entry No. 
4248675 at Book 5769, Page 1122 constitutes a valid perfected, 
third-priority lien in favor of Interlake upon the following 
described real property (the "Property") situated in Salt Lake 
County, Utah to-wit: 
Parcel 1 as described in the attached Exhibit 
"A. " 
10. There is now due and owing to Interlake under that 
certain Promissory Note dated March 31, 1986 (Loan No. 9142) (the 
"Third Promissory Note") the sum of $62,882.41, which sum 
includes outstanding principal and accrued interest to and 
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including January 19, 1990. Interest continues to accrue on the 
Third Promissory Note at the per diem rate of $16.27. 
11. That certain Deed of Trust with Assignment of 
Rents (the "Third Trust Deed") duly recorded in the office of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder on July 15, 1986 as Entry No. 4278658 
at Book 5790, Page 2068, constitutes a valid, perfected, second-
priority lien in favor of Interlake upon the following described 
real property (the "Property") situated in Salt Lake County, Utah 
to-wit: 
Parcels 2 and 3 as described in the attached 
Exhibit "A." 
12. There is now due and owing to Interlake under the 
First, Second, Third and Fourth Promissory Notes the sum of 
$9,942.50, which sum represents the attorneys' fees incurred to 
and including November 1, 1989, in collecting the amounts due 
under the subject promissory notes and the subject trust deeds. 
There also is now due and owing to Interlake the attorneys' fees 
which it has incurred from November 1, 1989 to and including the 
foreclosure of the Property in an amount to be established by 
affidavit. The amount of attorneys' fees incurred by November 1, 
1989 shall be prorated between the respective promissory notes 
and included in the amounts due thereunder. The amount of 
attorney's fees which have and will be incurred from November 1, 
1989 to the date of foreclosure shall be added to any deficiency 
resulting from the sale of the Property, or if a surplus results 
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from such sale, then the remaining attorneys' fees shall be paid 
from such surplus pursuant to further order of this Court. 
13. The First Promissory Note and First Trust Deed, 
the Second Promissory Note and Second Trust Deed, the Third 
Promissory Note and Third Trust Deed, and the Fourth Promissory 
Note and Fourth Trust Deed, shall be foreclosed and the Property 
sold by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, according to the laws 
and practices of this Court. The Sheriff shall first sell Parcel 
1 as described in the attached Exhibit "A," and then shall sell 
Parcels 2 and 3 together as described in the attached Exhibit 
"A." The proceeds from such sales shall be disbursed as follows: 
a. The Sheriff shall retain first his costs, 
disbursements, and commissions; 
b. The Sheriff shall then pay to Interlake, or 
its attorneys, the amount owing to Interlake under the First 
Promissory Note and First Trust Deed or so much of said sum as 
the proceeds will pay by first applying the proceeds from the 
sale of Parcels 2 and 3 and, then, if any balance remains due, 
applying the proceeds from the sale of Parcel 1. In calculating 
the amount due under the First Promissory Note, as well as the 
remaining promissory notes, the Sheriff shall include all 
interest which has accrued from January 19, 1990 to the date of 
the sale based on the per diem rates set forth herein; 
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c. The surplus proceeds from the sale of Parcel 
1, if any, shall then be paid to Interlake, or its attorneys, for 
the amount owing to Interlake under the Second Promissory Note 
and Second Trust Deed, or so much of said sum as the proceeds 
will pay; 
d. The surplus proceeds from the sale of Parcel 
1, if any, shall then be paid to Interlake, or its attorneys, for 
the amount owing to Interlake under the Fourth Promissory Note 
and Fourth Trust Deed, or so much of said sum as the proceeds 
will pay; 
e. The surplus proceeds from the sale of Parcels 
2 and 3, if any, shall then be paid to Interlake, or its 
attorneys, for the amount owing to Interlake under the Third 
Promissory Note and Third Trust Deed, or so much of said sum as 
the proceeds will pay; and 
f. The remaining surplus, if any, shall be 
accounted for and turned over to the Clerk of the Court subject 
to this Court's further order. 
14. Interlake may become a purchaser at said sale, and 
following said sale, the Sheriff shall issue his Certificate of 
Sale to the purchaser and his Sheriff's Deed to the holder 
thereof upon the expiration of the period of redemption, and upon 
the issuance of the Sheriff's Deed, all right, title and interest 
of the above-named defendants, and each of them, in and to the 
G:\WPl\159\00000239.W50 
-7-
Property shall be forever barred and foreclosed. If a deficiency 
results after application of the proceeds of the sale and 
foreclosure, as hereinabove provided, Interlake shall be entitled 
to have and recover a judgment on the First Promissory Note and 
First Trust Deed, Second Promissory Note and Second Trust Deed, 
Third Promissory Note and Third Trust Deed, and Fourth Promissory 
Note and Fourth Trust Deed, against Douglas Kent Allyn, Richard 
John Allyn, Sr., Allyn and Company, and John B. Swank for the 
full amount of the deficiency. 
15. Interlake is entitled to the possession of the 
Property, and shall have the right to manage and control the 
Property during the pendency of this action and during the 
statutory six month redemption period, including the right to 
execute, modify or terminate leases, to collect and use and 
retain as Interlake's sole and separate Property all rents and 
revenues of the Property and to personally manage the Property or 
enter into agreements for the management of the Property. 
16. Interlake shall be entitled to all rents and 
revenues of the Property from and after January 19, 1990, and 
John Swank and the Allyn Defendants shall turn over to Interlake 
all rents and revenues of the Property received by them and shall 
direct all tenants of the Property to pay all future rents to 
Interlake. 
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17. Interlake, the Allyn Defendants, and John B. Swank 
are authorized, ordered and directed to perform in accordance 
with the terms of this Order and Decree of Foreclosure. 
DATED this day of , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Timothy R. Hanson 
District Court Judge 
G:\WPL\159\00000239.W50 
-9-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order and Decree of Foreclosure was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this "?/$/* day of to the 
following: 
John B. Swank 
114 Flag Way 
Pasa Robles, California 93447 
John Burton Anderson, Esq. 
ANDERSON & DUNN 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn 
4 906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Allyn and Company 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
PARCEL 1: 
Beginning at a point North 281.687 feet and 
West 806.668 feet from the Salt Lake City 
Monument marking the intersection of 1000 
West Street and 1700 South Street, said point 
being located North 384.989 feet and West 
555.875 feet from the Center of Section 14, 
Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian and running thence South 
89§3'00" West 187.939 feet to a point of a 
815.369 foot radius curve to the right 
(radius point bears South 83i7 * 33 M East) 
thence Northeasterly along the arc of said 
curve 9.538 feet through a central angle of 
040 ' 13M to a point of tangency on a 875.539 
foot radius curve to the left (radius point 
bears North 8237' 20" West); thence 
Northwesterly along the arc of said curve 
112.740 feet through a central angle of 
722'40"; thence North 0.12 feet; thence 
North 89§3*00" East 94.958 feet; thence 
South 8932'00" East 17.678 feet; thence 
South 0fl7'00" East 95.817 feet; thence North 
89§3'00" East 66.636 feet to a point of 
tangency on a 37.00 foot radius curve to the 
left (radius point bears North 067'00" 
West); thence Northeasterly along the arc of 
said curve 30.599 feet through a central 
angle of 47^3' 00"; thence North 47^0' West 
20.50 feet? thence North 4230'00" East 
77.599 feet; thence South 4730*00" East 
46.50 feet; thence South 4230*00" West 
77.599 feet to a point of tangency on a 63.00 
foot radius curve to the right (radius point 
bears North 4730' West); thence 
Southwesterly along the arc of said curve 
52.101 feet through a central angle of 
4723'00" to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 2: 
Beginning at a point 284 feet North and 787 
feet West from the Southeast corner of the 
Northwest k of Section 14, Township 1 South, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
and running thence East 279.108 feet, more or 
less to a fence; thence North 1340' East 
223.575 feet, more or less, to the South line 
of Wenco Acres Subdivision; the West 387.3 
feet, more or less, to the East line of the 
Jordan River Parkway property, as conveyed in 
that certain Warranty Deed dated December 8, 
1975 and recorded February 3, 1976 as Entry 
No. 2782436 in Book 4094 at page 428; thence 
along said East line South 1413'29 M East 
224.76 feet, more or less to the point of 
beginning. 
LESS AND EXCEPTING THE FOLLOWING TWO PARCELS: 
Beginning at a point South 89§3' West 50.02 
from the Southwest corner of Lot 15, Wenco 
Acres Subdivision, being a part of Section 
14, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, said point being North 
00ll'15" East 403.22 feet along the monument 
line and West 1038.71 feet from the Salt Lake 
City monument marking the intersection of 
1000 West Street and 1700 South street and 
running thence South 0l43*50" East 217.33 
feet to the South line of grantors land; 
thence South 39§5'53" West 00.54 feet along 
said South line; thence North 14i3 ' 29 M West 
224.00 feet along the East boundary of the 
Jordan River Parkway land, thence North 
89§3' East 49.02 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
Beginning at a point North 281.687 feet and 
West 806.668 feet from the Salt Lake City 
Monument marking the intersection of 1000 
West Street and 1700 South Street, said point 
being located North 384.989 feet and West 
555.875 feet from the Center of Section 14, 
Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian and running thence South 
89§3'00" West 187.939 feet to a point of a 
815.369 foot radius curve to the right 
(radius point bears South 83l7'33" East) 
thence Northeasterly along the arc of said 
curve 9.538 feet through a central angle of 
040'13" to a point of tangency on a 875.539 
foot radius curve to the left (radius point 
bears North 8237'20" West); thence 
Northwesterly along the arc of said curve 
112.740 feet through a central angle of 
7^2'40"? thence North 0.12 feet; thence 
North 89§3'00" East 94.958 feet; thence 
South 8932'00" East 12*678 feet; thence 
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89§3'00" East 66.636 feet to a point of 
tangency on a 37.00 foot radius curve to the 
left (radius point bears North Gfl7'00" 
West); thence Northeasterly along the arc of 
said curve 30.599 feet through a central 
angle of 4723'00"; thence North 4730' West 
20.50 feet; thence North 4230,00" East 
77.599 feet; thence South 4730'00" East 
46.50 feet; thence South 4230'00" West 
77.599 feet to a point of tangency on a 63.00 
foot radius curve to the right (radius point 
bears North 47^0' West); thence 
Southwesterly along the arc of said curve 
52.101 feet through a central angle of 
4723'00" to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 3: 
Beginning at a point 155 feet North and 807 
feet West from the center of Section 14, 
Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, said point being on the 
Northerly Right-of-Way line of 1700 South and 
the Easterly line of the Provo Jordan River 
Parkway Authority property and running thence 
North 2l9'21" East 129.16 feet along the 
Jordan River Parkway; thence East 30.00 feet; 
thence South OflO'21" East 129.050 feet to 
the North Right-of-Way line of 1700 South; 
thence South 89§9'39" West along said Right-
of-Way line 35.247 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
G:\WPL\159\00000239.W50 
-3-
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Thomas T. Billings, Bar No. 0331 
John A. Anderson, Bar No. 4464 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
USA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
dba Interlake Thrift -
Mortgage Division, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
JOHN B. SWANK and DOUGLAS 
KENT ALLYN dba J & D 
PROPERTIES, a California 
Partnership; DOUGLAS KENT 
ALLYN and RICHARD JOHN 
ALLYN, SR., dba ALLYN AND 
COMPANY, a California 
Partnership, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff USA Financial Corporation, dba Interlake 
Thrift - Mortgage Division ("Interlake") having moved for entry 
of a default judgment against defendant John B. Swank, whose 
default was entered by the Clerk of this Court on February 23, 
1989; and Interlake having moved for summary judgment against 
defendants Douglas Kent Allyn, Richard John Allyn, Sr., and Allyn 
and Company (the "Allyn Defendant"), and this Court having 
entered its Minute Entry dated January 24, 1990, granting 
ORDER AND DECREE 
OF FORECLOSURE 
Civil No. C86-6726 
Honorable John A. Rokich 
plaintiff's motion for entry of default and summary judgments, 
and good cause appear herefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The motion of plaintiff Interlake for default 
judgment against defendant John B. Swank is hereby granted. 
2. The motion of plaintiff Interlake for summary 
judgment against defendants Douglas Kent Allyn, Richard John 
Allyn, and Allyn and Company, a California partnership, is hereby 
granted. 
3. There is now due and owing to Interlake under that 
certain Promissory Note dated November 5, 1985 (the "Commerce 
Financial Note") the sum of $866,550.08, which sum includes 
outstanding principal and interest to and including January 26, 
1990. Interest continues to accrue on the Commerce Financial 
Note at the rate of $264.54 per diem. 
4. That certain Deed of Trust with Assignment of 
Rents dated November 5, 1985 ("Commerce Financial Trust Deed") 
duly recorded in the Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder on 
November 6, 1985, as Entry No. 4160854 at Book 5707, Page 793, 
constitutes a valid, perfected, first-priority lien in favor of 
Interlake upon the following described real property (the 
"Property") situated in Salt Lake County, Utah to-wit: 
See property description in attached Exhibit "A." 
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5. There is now due and owing to Interlake under that 
certain Promissory Note dated October 31, 1985, (the "Interlake 
Thrift Note") the sum of $382,655.82, which sum includes 
outstanding principal and interest to and including January 26, 
1990. Interest continues to accrue on the Interlake Thrift Note 
at the rate of $123.96 per diem. 
6. That certain Deed of Trust with Assignment of 
Rents ("Interlake Thrift Trust Deed") duly recorded in the office 
of the Salt Lake County Recorder on March 7, 1986, as Entry No. 
4211971 at Book 5742, Page 2990, constitutes a valid, perfected, 
second-priority lien in favor of Interlake upon the following 
described real property (the "Property") situated in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, to-wit: 
See the property description in attached Exhibit "A." 
7. That certain Assignment duly recorded in the 
Official Records of Los Angeles County, California on March 11, 
1986 as Entry No. 86-303592, constitutes a valid sale and/or 
assignment to Interlake of Allyn and Company's limited 
partnership interest, in the amount of 16.3636%, in PRB, Ltd.s 
interest in and to the following described real property situated 
in Los Angeles County, California, to-wit: 
See the property description in attached Exhibit "B." 
In the event the above-described Property has been sold, or this 
interest has otherwise been impaired, then a lien shall attach to 
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Allyn & Company's share in and to the proceeds from any such 
sale. 
8. There is now due and owing to Interlake under the 
Commerce Financial Note and Interlake Thrift Note the additional 
sum of $5,948.75, which sum represents the attorneys' fees 
incurred by Interlake to and including November 1, 1989, in 
collecting the amounts due under the Commerce Financial and 
Interlake Thrift Promissory Notes and the subject Trust Deeds. 
There also is now due and owing to Interlake the attorneys' fees 
which it has incurred from November 1, 1989 to and including the 
date of foreclosure of the Property in an amount to be 
established by affidavit. The amount of attorneys' fees incurred 
by November 1, 1989 shall be pro rated between the respective 
promissory notes and included in the amounts due thereunder. The 
amount of attorneys' fees which have been incurred from November 
lf 1989 to the date of foreclosure shall be added to any 
deficiency resulting from the sale of the property, or if a 
surplus results from such sale, then the remaining attorneys' 
fees shall be paid from such surplus pursuant to further order of 
this Court. 
9. The Assignment is hereby foreclosed and the 
interest of Allyn and Company in PRB, Ltd.'s interest in the real 
property located in Los Angeles County, State of California 
(Exhibit B) shall be the sole property of Interlake. All right, 
G:\WPL\159\000002AP.W50 
-4-
title and interest of Allyn and Company, and/or its partners, in 
said property is hereby forever barred and foreclosed. 
10. The Commerce Financial Note and the Interlake 
Thrift Note shall be foreclosed and the Property sold by the 
Sheriff of Salt Lake County, according to the laws and practices 
of this Court. The Sheriff, out of such proceeds, shall retain 
first his costs, disbursements, commissions, and then pay to 
Interlake, or its attorneys, the amount owing to Interlake under 
the Commerce Financial Note and Commerce Financial Trust Deed or 
so much of said sum as the proceeds will pay. The surplus, if 
any, shall then be paid to Interlake, or its attorneys, for the 
amount owing to Interlake under the Interlake Thrift Promissory 
Note and Interlake Thrift Trust Deed or so much of said sum as 
the proceeds will pay. In calculating the amounts due under the 
Commerce Financial and Interlake Promissory Notes, the Sheriff 
shall include interest which accrues between January 26, 1990 and 
the date of sale based on the per diem rates set forth herein. 
The remaining surplus, if any, shall be accounted for and turned 
over to the Clerk of the Court and is subject to this Court's 
further order. 
11. Interlake may become a purchaser at said sale, and 
following said sale, the Sheriff shall issue his Certificate of 
Sale to the purchasers and his Sheriff's Deed to the holder 
thereof upon the expiration of the period of redemption, and upon 
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the issuance of the Sheriff's Deed, all right, title and interest 
of the above-named defendants, and each of them, in and to the 
Property shall be forever barred and foreclosed. 
12. If a deficiency results after application of the 
proceeds of the sale and foreclosure, as hereinabove provided, 
Interlake shall be entitled to have and recover a judgment on the 
Commerce Financial Note against defendant John B. Swank for the 
full amount of the deficiency. Interlake shall also be entitled 
to have and recover a judgment on the Interlake Thrift Promissory 
Note and Interlake Thrift Trust Deed against John B. Swankf 
Douglas Kent Allyn, Richard John Allyn, Sr., and Allyn and 
Company. 
13. Interlake is entitled to the possession of the 
Property, and shall have the right to manage and control the 
Property during the pendency of this action and during the 
statutory six month redemption period, including the right to 
execute, modify or terminate leases, to collect and use and 
retain as Interlake's sole and separate property all rents and 
revenues of the Property and to personally manage the Property or 
enter into agreements for the management of the Property. 
14. Interlake shall be entitled to all rents and 
revenues of the Property from and after January 26, 1990, and 
John Swank and the Allyn Defendants shall turn over to Interlake 
all rents and revenues of the Property received by them and shall 
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direct all tenants of the Property to pay all future rents to 
Interlake. 
15. Interlake, the Allyn Defendants, and John B. Swank 
are authorized, ordered and directed to perform in accordance 
with the terms of this Order and Decree of Foreclosure. 
DATED this day of , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
John A. Rokich 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order and Decree of Foreclosures was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this ?M~~day o r ^ ^ > ^ ^ — F 1990f to the 
following: 
John B. Swank 
114 Flag Way 
Pasa Robles, California 93447 
John Burton Anderson, Esq. 
ANDERSON & DUNN 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Richard John Allyn, Sr. 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
Allyn and Company 
c/o Douglas Kent Allyn 
4906 New Ranch Road 
El Cajon, California 92020 
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EXHIBIT "A 
Parcel It 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 3, Block 36, Plat "B", 
Salt Lake City Survey and running thence South 82*5 feet; thence 
West 54 feet; thence North 155 feet; thence East 54 feet; thence 
South 72*3 feet to the place of beginning• 
Parcel ?: 
Beginning at a point 54 feet West of the Northeast corner of Lot 
3, Block 36 Plat "B", Salt Lake City Survey and running thence 
South 82*5 feet; thence West 37 feet; thence North 155 feet; 
thence East 37 feet; thence South 72*5 feet to the place of 
beginning. 
Parcel 3? 
Beginning 91 feet West of the Northeast corner of Lot 3, Block 
36, Plat "B", Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence south 82*5 
feet; thence West 37 feet; thence North 155 feet; thence East 37 
feet; thence South 72*5 feet to the place of beginning. 
Parcel 4: 
Beginning at a point 128 feet West from the Northeast corner of 
Lot 3, Block 36 Plat "B", Salt Lake City Survey and running 
thence South 82*5 feet; thence West 37 feet; thence North 155 
feet; thence East 37 feet; thence South 72*5 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
Together with a Right of Way over: Beginning 72*5 feet North of 
the Southeast corner of Lot 4, in said Block and running thence 
West 330 feet; thence North 10 feet; thence East 330 feet; thence 
South 10 feet to the place of beginning. 
Beginning at the Northwest corner of Lot 4, Bock 36, Plat "B", 
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence South 82*5 feet; thence 
East 165 feet; thence North 82*5 feet; thence West 165 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
Together with a Right of Way over the following: Beginning 82*5 
feet South from the Northwest corner of Lot 4, and running thence 
South 10 feet; thence East 175 feet; thence North 10 feet; thence 
West 175 feet to the point of beginning. 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
Parcel 23, Book 8302, Page 22 of the Tax Assessor's Rolls for Los 
Angeles County consisting of 2.02 acres legally described as 
follows: 
"That portion of the East half of the West half of the 
Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 5, 
Township 1 South, Range 9 West, San Bernardino Meridian, in 
the County of Los Angeles, State of California, according 
to the official plat thereof, described as follows: 
Beginning at a point in the South line of said East half, 
distant thereon North 8926'30" West 32.50 feet from the 
Southeast corner of said East half; thence parallel with 
the East line of said East half, North 060*58" West 350.00 
feet; thence parallel with said South line, North 8926*30" 
West 293.04 feet, more or less, to the West line of said 
East half; thence Southerly and Easterly along the West and 
South lines of said East half to the point of beginning. 
Except therefrom the South 30.00 feet of said East half." 
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